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ABSTRACT

This master's thesis defines the legacy ofepistemic rhetoric

from Greek to contemporary times. Epistemic rhetoric is defined as a
knowledge-discovering rhetoricin Classical times,and a knowledgecreating rhetoric in contemporary times. Sociaily-constracted

discourse communities are the contemporary epistemological base
though which epistemic rhetoric is understood and expressed. These

discourse communities express themselves in both inclusionary and
exclusionary language, which has important implications in the
teaching ofcontemporary composition. The conclusion of this thesis
is that the foundational and exclusionary tension in discourse
communities limits composition studies, as well as knowledge

creation in general. TTie anti-foundational and inclusionary tension,
on the other hand,enables composition studies as well as the
creation of knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION

Does rhetoric create or discover knowledge? Composition
studies has inherited this dialectic in the form or epistemic rhetoric,

a rhetoric whose tradition and dialectic begin with Plato and the

Sophists. In Classical times Plato articulated his foundational belief
that rhetoric aided in the discovery of pre-existing archetypal truths.

The dominant contemporary position, however,has been articulated
by various anti-foundationalists who believe that truth is socially
constructed by discourse communities. Both points of view are

embedded in epistemic rhetoric,a rhetoric thatis concemed with the

relationship between language and knowledge, yet how could these
positions differ so radically? In my thesis I will explore this dialectic

as a way to understand what epistemic rhetoric is, what epistemic
rhetoric has been,and how epistemic rhetoric affects contemporary
composition studies today.

Chapter one will explore the three dominant contemporary
definitions of epistemic rhetoric that map out its territory in
composition studies. At one end is the anti-foundationalist James

Berlin who defines epistemic rhetoric ideologically(Rhetoric and

Reality 165-179). At the other extreme is Richard Fulkerson who
allows for both foundational and anti-foundational definitions of

epistemic rhetoric(409-411). Covering the middle ground is
Kenneth Bruffee,along with other anti-foundational social
constructionists, who calls for exploratory interdisciplinary searches

for definitions in fields that are affected by social constructionism in

an effort to create a bibliographic base that would allow composition
studies to come to consensus on a definition of epistemic rhetoric

(Social Construction 773). Clarifying and analyzing the definitions
sought by Berlin,Fulkerson,and Bruffee will display the dialectic in
current thinking thatis inherent in any examination of epistemic
rhetoric.

Chapter two will examine the historical roots of this dialectic

within epistemic rhetoric. Beginning with Plato's ideal of epistemic
rhetoric(Bizzell,Herzberg 55-143),I will demonstrate that Plato's
argument for a foundational epistemic rhetoric was not completely

countered until the 19th century when Nietzsche wrote that rhetoric
is dissimulation(Miller 316-319 and Bizzell 885-896). With Plato on
the side of "truth," and Nietzsche on the side of"lies," the p^ameters
ofthe the epistemic dialectic were finally defined. I will then show
that the modem response has been more towards Nietzsche's than

Plato's, since anti-foundational,socially-constmcted thought,that

believes that knowledge can never transcend language,has evolved
as the dominant epistemic rhetoric(Berlin 183-184).
In the third and last chapter,I will explore how epistemic

rhetoric has influenced contemporary composition studies by
examining how epistemic rhetoric enables and how it limits
composition studies philosophically and pedagogically. In particular,

I will explore how epistemic rhetoric's idea of discourse communities,
which is fraught with an inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic(Russell

53-56), has allowed composition studies to expand beyond the
traditional hegemony ofthe formalist or current traditional rhetoric

ofthe academic discourse community,and consequently has changed

not only the ways composition studies approaches writing, but the
ways in which composition studies thinks about knowledge and its

relationship to writing. The thesis thatI will arrive at in chapter
three is that the foundational and exclusionary tensions limit
composition studies pedagogically and epistemologically, whereas the
anti-foimdational and inclusionary tensions enable composition

studies to more effectively teach writing and thought.
Throughout these three chapters Twill expose how the
rhetorical dialectic or debate has changed. The Classical dialectic
revolved around the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage, whereas
the modem dialectic has revolved around the foundational and anti-

foundational epistemological nature oflanguage. This changed
dialectic from ethics to epistemology represents the change that

epistemic rhetoric has experienced within its legacy,a legacy in
which discourse changed from being the dressing of thought to the
substance of thoughtitself.
I think that it is important to understand that epistemic

rhetoric is not a commonly refeired to term in composition studies.

The realm in which it can be defined is notcommonly understood;its
history is complex and extensive,the research is at times

incomprehensibly jargon filled,its pedagogical and philosophical
applications can be confusing,and so consequently epistemic rhetoric

has lived in the shadow of social constuctionism,the dominant

contemporary expression ofepistemic rhetoric, but not the epistemic
rhetoric that has been known and used throughout the rhetorical

tradition. It would take more than a thesis, or even alarge book,to

deal effectively with all the problems that affect an understanding of
epistemic rhetoric. Despite that,I feel that a thesis like this is
needed,particularly in the wake ofJames Berlin's death,since he has
championed the epistemological and ideological influences of
epistemic rhetoric in composition studies more than any
contemporary scholar. I'm certainly not in a position to fill the void
that may occur because of the lack ofJames Berlin's scholarship, but

I hope that I will contribute to a growing understanding of epistemic
rhetoric, determining some of its history, and showing how it both

enables and limits composition studies.
Lastly,let me apologize to the reader in advance for a difficulty

he or she may have in entering in to the discourse ofepistemic

rhetoric as presented in this thesis. In researching and writing this
thesis I have had to synthesize a complex,ever-evolving,jargon-

filled, and oftentimes contradictory discourse that, despite its call to
be inclusionary and reader friendly,for the most part remains
reader hostile and exclusion^y. If the reader finds himself or

herselffeeling lost or confused with the relatively inclusionary style
that I am trying to use in thesis,I would ask the reader to spend a
few minutes reading Foucault,Nietztche,Plato, or any of the other
source material in order to appreciate the difficulty I have had in

attempting to present this often-times exclusionary research in both
an accurate and reader friendly manner.

Brad McClanahan
June 1996

CHAPTER ONE

WHAT IS EPISTEMIC RHETORIC?

The belief that rhetoric either discovers or creates knowledge
has been part ofthe rhetorical tradition since the Sophists and Plato.
Contemporary epistemic rhetoric is the modem vehicle for that

rhetorical tradition, but the dominant epistemological conclusions
today are contrary to the dominant epistemological conclusions in

Classical times. From Classical times,the legacy ofPlatonic thought
has dominated over Sophistic thought,and consequently rhetoric was
seen as an epistemic vehicle though dialectic to a transcendent

absolutist truth,also referred to as foundational,logocentric,or
universal truth. In contemporary times however,the thought of
socially constracted discourse communities has dominated over the

absolutist thought,and consequently rhetoric is seen as an epistemic
vehicle through dialectic to relative socially constructed truths, also

referred to as anti-foundational,post-positivist,or relative trath.

Simplistically put. Classical epistemic rhetoric has represented

foundational thought,discovered knowledge, whereas contemporary
epistemic rhetoric has represented anti-foundational thought,
created knowledge.

The terminology that surrounds composition studies has

flourished in the last thirty years,and the appearance ofepistemic
rhetoric, both as a term and as a way ofknowing,writing, and
teaching,is not an exception.^ Some would say this explosion of
terminology is a sign that composition studies is experiencing a
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Kuhnian crisis and the new terminology reflects a paradigm shift in

the making. Others would say that the new terminology is due to the
creation and expansion of new and divergent discourse communities

that have expanded awareness beyond the legacy of traditional

scholarship. And still others would putit in the realm of political
dialectic. I believe that all these positions are valid since
composition studies,seen from a meta-historical perspective,is a
young field in the process of defining itself to others and to itself. In
such a young field many new terms do not survive for more than one

published article. Epistemic rhetoric is not one ofthose terms.

Epistemic rhetoric has a legacy behind it. Even so,in a field of
expanding terminology,it is hard to define epistemic rhetoric,

particularly because ofthe frequently impenetrable quality of the
research and writing. Consequently there are many logistical and

philosophical problems in defining the theories and practices of

composition studies,including the defining ofepistemic rhetoric, but
three problems in particular stick outfor me.

Problems in Defining

First of all, there's the problem of whether composition studies

is an independent field or not. Being an independent field that can
claim the legacy ofrhetoric and stand firmly within the English

studies tripod oflinguistics,literature, and composition makes a huge
difference in the process of self-definition. Stephen North,in his
book The Making ofKnowledge: Portrait ofan Emerging Field, makes

an excellent argumentfor composition studies being a field, but he,

like Edward J. Corbett,concedes that composition studies is a young
field. Both North and Corbett place its beginning in 1963 at the
Conference on College Composition and Communication. Corbett
chooses 1963 because of the common use ofthe word rhetoric that

began during that CCCC conference(Corbett 445). North chooses

1963 because of the Braddock Study, which essentially claimed that
we knew nothing about to research and teach composition

effectively, and also because composition was made a third leg in the
academic reform movement with literature and linguistics(North

15). The paradigm had shifted pedagogically and rhetorically,and
composition became "Composition Studies"(North 12-17). Without

entering into further details ofthis debate, which still continues, my
position for this thesis is that composition studies is an independent
field and in defining epistemic rhetoric I will claim the legacy of
rhetoric.

Secondly, we have the problem that each definition represents
a paradigm,and the paradigm must be agreed upon before an

understanding can take place of that definition within that paradigm.
According to Thomas Kuhn,changes occur in science, nature, and in

other academic and political fields when a paradigm no longer
answers research questions adequately(Kuhn 109). As North,

Corbett,and others have written,this shift began for composition
studies in 1963 with such university crises as open enrollment and a
general questioning of academic authority. And as Maxine Hairston

writes, who traces this period of social upheaval that has parallelled
the pedagogical and philosophical growth ofcomposition studies,

Kuhn's book was also published in 1963(Hairston 76). Although
some will argue about what stage in the shift composition studies is
in,I simply want to point out that my argumentfor an epistemic

rhetoric presupposes the nature of paradigm shifts in all fields of
study. Given the existence of paradigm shifts, defining epistemic
rhetoric in a time ofchange is an unwieldly, yet necessary,task.
Composition studies is a young field, definitions are still very
slippery,particularly as seen from an anti-foundational point of
view,and the term epistemic rhetoric is not a commonly used term
in the field.

Thirdly,and related to the problem ofchanging paradigms,is

Foucault's concept of an epwtme,the epistemological field. Just as
understanding Kuhn's now widely accepted theory of paradigm shifts
is important in trying to understand the nature of definitions in a
young,independent,and changing field,it is also important in
understanding the epistemological shiftfrom foundational to antifoundational thought that has occurred in the Western tradition and
consequently in epistemic rhetoric. I will discuss the epistemological

shift in more detail in chapters two and three, but underlying the

process of defining epistemic rhetoric is Foucault's idea ofthe

episteme ,the ever shifting epistemological field, the fabric of
thought and reality itself. Foucault feels that the Western episteme
began to change in the 19th century,Nietzsche's century(The Order

of Things 304-305). Many others,such as Knoblauch and Brannon,

feel that the shift in the Western episteme began during the 17th
century and the Scientific Revolutioil(4), I will argue with Foucault
that the paradigm shift occurred in theepisteme most definitively in

the 19th century.In the 19th century. Classical thought no longer
represented our emerging modem and post-modem thought,or in

other words a Kuhnian paradigm shift was occurring. The rhetorical
debate in this episteme,and the consequent paradigm shift, tumed
from the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage to foundational and
anti-foundational views on language and reality. Composition studies
and current epistemic rhetoric have grown up during,and out of,this
anti-foundational shift in the episteme and so it will inherently

affect epistemic rhetoric's definition. These issues of definition will

become clearer towards the end of the chapter.

A Definition ofEpistemic Rhetoric

Before I give the definition ofepistemic rhetoric that I will be
using in this thesis, allow me to say that understanding how I came
up with the definition is almost as important as the definition itself.
There are so many paradigms in the act of defining, and so many
mbrics used within those paradigms,and these paradigms and
rubrics reveal how composition studies defines itself as a whole. In

other words,I will give my definition ofepistemic rhetoric, but then
I will take the rest of chapter one to demonstrate how I had to come

up with that definition and why that process of defining is inherent
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to an understanding ofepistemic rhetoric. In short,epistemic
rhetoric embodies the dialectical nature of the continual human

search for truth and knowledge which includes the search for
definitions.

1 define epistemic rhetoric as follows:
Epistemic rhetoric is a rhetoric that assumes and teaches that

language is the basis for all human understanding of
knowledge,whether foundational or anti-foundational, and that
effective use and understanding oflanguage leads to the
creation or discovery of knowledge,eitherfrom or for the self,
or from or for the society. Effective use and understanding of
epistemic rhetoric would emphasize the dialectical, as well as

the formalistic, nature oflanguage and knowledge in relation to
the self,society, and whatis perceived to be reality.
1 don't believe that my definition ofepistemic rhetoric is

definitive, but 1 hope that it will be comprehensive,as we will see
when we analyze it at the end of this chapter. As is evident, this
definition reflects the epistemic legacy ofboth foundational and anti-

foundational beliefs. A foundational definition of epistemic rhetoric
may have been dominant in Classical times, butin contemporary
times the dominant usage of epistemic rhetoric reflects an anti-

foundational epistemology, which,as Joseph Petraglia asserts,is
completely construed with social constructionism.

Petraglia writes,"a social constructionist argues that knowledge

is created, maintained,and altered though an individual's interaction

with and within his or her'discourse community'"(Petraglia 38).

Simply by understanding that knowledge is socially constructed,
immediately there are problems in definitively defining epistemic
rhetoric. Since the definition is based on the ongoing dialectic within
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a diverse and everchanging discourse community of compositionists
who align themselves with epistemic rhetoric,the definition will

continue to change over time. According to Schiappa,"rhetoric's
epistemic status, and the emerging controversy concerning the utility
of social constructionism..." are two ofthe hottest topics in
composition studies today(Schiappa 401). And so,in a sense,this
thesis is marking my entrance into the epistemic discourse
community. This means that in defining epistemic rhetoric,I will
have to define what the current community understands it to be,and
in the course of the thesis,I will also define what it means to me as a

member of that community.

Definition Paradigms

Having given the above definition ofepistemic rhetoric,I
would now like to explore why definitions,temiinologies,and
taxonomies in composition studies are hard to determine.
In searching through the literature on whatI took to be

epistemic rhetoric,and the taxonomizing ofcomposition studies as a
whole,I have come up with six different paradigms that are used to
define composition studies,three of which produce clarity at the

meta-level,and three which produce confusion because they neglect

the meta-level. The three paradigms that neglect the meta-level are:
(1)Pedagogical definitions,(2)Procedural definitions, and(3)
Epistemological definitions. The three at the meta-level are: (1)

Theory-based definitions,(2)Ideologically-based definitions,and(3)
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Exploratory definitions. These last three try to integrate other fields
of study into composition studies so thatenough information can

existfor an eventual consensus to take place on whatis epistemic
rhetoric. Of these six paradigms,the theory based definition,

championed by Fulkerson,and ideological based definitions,
championed by Berlin are the most powerful,as we will see later in
this chapter. The exploratory definitions championed by the
interdisciplinary bibliographic work of Kenneth A.Bruffee and many
others,are also helpful in understanding epistemic rhetoric at a
meta-level, but they resultin an incompleteness. Although I have

most heavily relied on Fulkerson and Berlin for my definition of
epistemic,each of the these definition paradigms will have to be
explored to understand the dilemma in defining epistemic rhetoric.
Before exploring the three meta-level paradigms,I must

critique the shortcomings ofthe three paradigms for definitions that
neglect the meta-level. The three paradigms of pedagogy, procedure,
and epistemology can not dojustice to a definition of epistemic

rhetoric because they are only looking at a piece of the whole. The
pedagogical definition only looks at how an epistemic rhetoric might
be taught. A precedural definition ofepistemic rhetoric only looks at

how composition texts are created and whether we stress the process

or the product more in the procedure. The epistemological definition
only looks at what counts as knowledge or how knowledge is made.
Although these three paradigms are important in
understanding epistemic rhetoric, and I will refer to them both in
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this chapter and in chapter three,they do not provide a clear and
complete definition of epistemic rhetoric. I believe that epistemic
rhetoricians would agree that epistemic rhetoric is minimally a
philosophy,meaning a search for tmth and knowledge through
language,and at best a theory,meaning a set of principles about
truth and its relation to language and the best methods to implement

these principles. If either the philosophical or theoretical views are

true, then simple pedagogical,procedural,or epistemological
definitions of epistemic rhetoric can not give us a complete
definition.

I'll now expand on this assertion by examining the three metalevel definition paradigms; Bruffee's exploratory approach,Berlin's
ideological approach,and Fulkerson's theoretical approach.

Meta-LevelDefinitions

After many years of confusion about how an epistemic rhetoric
should be defined and understood,Kenneth Bruffee >vrote in 1986

that the solution can come through the interdisciplinary exploration

of bibliographic definitions(Social Construction 773). In 1988 James
Berlin posits that ideological definitions are the most accurate and

helpful in understanding the rise of an epistemic rhetoric(Rhetoric

and Ideology 477). Richard Fulkerson, writing in 1990,argues that a
theory based definition that separates the ends and the means is the
most helpful(Fulkerson 409). In order to understand epistemic
rhetoric, we must first understand how Braffee,Berlin, and
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Fulkerson would go about defining epistemic rhetoric. From the

disparities and similarities in their perspectives,an understanding of
epistemic rhetoric will emerge. I'll start with the state of definitions

that Bruffee and others inherited when he called for his exploratory
approach,and then we can move chronologically to Berlin and finally
to Fulkerson.

Bruffee's Exploratory Approach
As composition studies moves away from the formalistic

writing classroom,many compositionists search for pedagogy,
procedures,and epistemology that respond progressively to the

changes in the university writing classroom. Many scholars like
Kenneth Bruffee have found themselves to be part of a growing

group of"social constructionists," a group that advocates pedagogy
that includes collaborative learning, procedures that stress process
over product, and an epistemology based on the concept of discourse
communities that sees the writing process as knowledge creating

instead knowledge discovering. Most importantly,Bruffee sees this
emerging rhetoric as a socially-constructed,knowledge-creating
rhetoric, an epistemic rhetoric on the anti-foundational side of

theepistemological dialectic. As an emerging discourse community

within the shifting paradigm of composition studies, self-definition
for this group becomes difficult. Bruffee attempts to offer a solution
to the problem of definitions by exploring the existing
interdisciplinary bibliographic sources that bring light about
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epistemic rhetoric to the young field ofcomposition studies.

Essentially Bruffee,as one of the most prominent compositionists in
this diverse group of explorers,is trying to take definitions from the

disciplines of philosophy,anthropology,linguistics, politics,the
sciences and use that research to bring composition studies to
consensus on the definition and role of a social constructionist

epistemic rhetoric. Although this exploratory approach is helpful,it
also problematizes the concept ofepistemic rhetoric. Bruffee states
the problem like this:
During the past 75 years the benefits of the debate in
cognitive terms about education - with its ethnocentric
emphasis on universals and absolutes,its endless circularity
oscillating between the 'subjective' and the'objective,'its
alienating emphasis on individuality, and its need to
continually ignore,suppress,or side step the unbridgeable
abyss inherent in our cognitive vocabulary between learner
and whatis learned - has become increasingly dubious. (Social
Construction 778-779)

In other words,an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to

deal with the paradigm shift from foundational to anti-foundational
thought,from the universal to the^social constructionist thought. So
who does Bruffee look to in order to bring clarity to this emerging
group of social constructionists? Bruffee explores the scholarhship of
Foucault in history and philosophy, Geertzfrom anthropology,Kuhn

from the theory of science.Burke from rhetoric, and the philosophers
Rorty,Dewey,Heidegger,and Wiggenstein(773-779). Jim Corder,
who explores many ofthe same sources, would add other social

constructionist scholars such as Kinneavy,Kitzhaber, Ong,and
Perelman. Corder writes,"We have not yet seriously begun to
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explore rhetoric as a portal to other fields. Rhetoric may not be able
to do for other fields what their own methodologies have not done,

but rhetoric can help us see things in other fields in new ways,and
when we can see in new ways,we may think new thoughts"(167).
Starting in the mid-seventies,influenced primarily by social

constructionist thoughtfrom other fields of study like politics and

linguistics, many composition practioners besides Bruffee and Corder
began to explore "rhetoric as a portal" because they saw that their
thinking aboutlanguage's relation to knowledge,as seen in the
writing process,had changed from their classical and/or formalist

training. Epistemic rhetoric in these situations was described in
pedagogical,procedural, and epistemological methodologies that tried
to get at the core of this emerging composition philosophy, a
philosophy emerging from exploring interdisciplinary research. Hie
definitions at first were confused,but eventually,they began to take
shape under the social constructionist epistemology. Yet underlying

all these definitions was the paradigm shift, an acknowledgement
that all the old words no longer described the new ideas. The

definitions were representative of the crisis in composition studies as
a whole,the old no longer answered the new,the traditional fell
short ofthe contemporary. Socially constructed thought and the
heed for dialectic in the new discourse communities,academic and

otherwise,could not be recognized in the existing language.
Epistemic rhetoric, as a defined territory, was a thought in the
process of creation,just as the language around it was in the process
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of creation or at least ofredetinition. As the thinking has become
clearer,so has the language and vice versa,and so within the process

of social construction many traditional definitions were tried and

discarded because the chronological baggage on these words proved
no longer effective to express contemporary thought. For example,
discourse no longer meant the clothing ofthought, but thoughtitself.
Before Bruffee's attempts to bring clarity to composition in an
emerging interdisciplinary understanding ofsocial constructionism,

there were many other epistemic pioneers in composition studies.
I'd like to look atfive compositionists that were involved in this
exploratory process.

In 1978 Richard E.Young writes in Research on Composing in a
chapter entitled "Paradigms and Problems: Needed Research in

Rhetorical Invention," that composition's current-traditonal paradigm
is in crisis(29-31). Using the terminology and the point of view of
Thomas Kuhn's Structure ofScientific Revolutions, Young argues that
the current traditional composition paradigm can not answer the
questions that have been posed by such changes in academia and

society such as the open university,feminist thought, and multi
culturalism. A crisis like this must change the paradigm away from

formalism to a new rhetoric. At the time of writing. Young does not

use the term epistemic rhetoric, but he does outline a possible action
plan. In order to respond to a crisis in the paradigm. Young argues
that we must look both back toward the rhetorical tradition and

forward to a new rhetoric. The thread of the rhetorical tradition, an
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episteriiic rhetoric, has been lost to him as a student of literature, but
Young knows that through research this rich legacy will provide the
epistemological framework for a new rhetoric.
In 1980 Kenneth Dowst wrote a chapter entitled,"The

Epistemic Approach: Writing,Knowing,and Learning," in the book
Eight Approaches to Teaching Composition. Dowst uses the

communications triangle to define epistemic rhetoric, arguing that
epistemic rhetoric favors the writer over language,and reality.
Defined in that hierarchial order of writer,language,and reality,
composition is then seen as a way of making knowledge through

writing because the writer's language is reflecting the socially
constructed nature of truth. Dowst goes on to show that the

epistemic approach,a knowledge creating approach,is an

improvement over "formalist," "referential," or "expressive"
approaches to composition(66-68). Typical ofearly definitions, this
is more a pedagogical definition than a meta-level definition as

Berlin and Fulkerson will later offer. But as Bruffee writes,
"Terminology proliferates" in a paradigm shift, particularly when

exploring for interdisciplinary pillars(Social Construction 773).
Exploring the usefulness of that terminology has been one of the

mostimportantroles of this exploratory group of composition

scholars,and Dowst's language includes the first use of the term
epistemic rhetoric. Epistemic rhetoric for Dowst suggests a
knowledge making,not knowledge discovering,rhetoric. Epistemic

rhetoric consequently expresses the contemporary bias for an anti
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foundational rhetoric based on socially-constructed knowledge
creation.

According to Ann Berthoff in The Making ofMeaning:
Metaphors,Models,and Maximsfor Writing Teachers,composition

practitioners must search to integrate theory and practice. In other
words,they must create a "praxis" that "can develop an authentic

pedagogy of knowing"(19). Berthoffconsequently is within this
exploratory group that is trying to move beyond the procedural,
pedagogical,and epistemological paradigms to an inclusive epistemic

theory. In her opinion,"the best way to keep theory lively and

practice responsive is to have in mind models and metaphors to
remind teachers and their students of whatis involved in learning

and teaching the composing process"(5). Berthoff goes on to
demonstrate how metaphorical thinking makes an understanding of
models and maxims from which to teach,thus enhancing the
metaphorical position oflanguage that is used by many epistemic
rhetoricians. Coming out of one of the first philosophical, yet

procedural,statements created in composition studies, namely
"process over product," Berthoff,as a social constructionist, would not

side with the world view that truth pre-exists language. Berthoff
claims that her roots are in LA.Richards and "his convention that the

classroom is the philosophical laboratory"(18), as well as the

linguistic,rhetorical,and philosophical views of Burke,Vygotsky,
Cassirer,Friere,Langer,Sapir, Whitehead,and Tolstoy. Written in
the years preceeding and including 1981,Berthoffs book is more of a
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call for an epistemic rhetoric that a definition ofit(107). This is
typical of compositionists writing in the 1970s and early 1980s.

JanetEmig is also in this early group. Like many
compositionists,Emig turns to Vygotsky for answers to language's
relationship to thought,and hence the title of her 1983 book.The
Web ofMeaning: Essays on Writing,Teaching,Learning,and

Thinking. As literary students have been influenced by psychology,
so have composition studies, particularly in search for anti-

foundational epistemologies that could reflect the reality of the
contemporary writing class. The paradigm has been shifting, and
many composition teachers have become open to new theories to
explain contemporary problems. For instance,Edward M.White

writes in "Post-Structural Literary Criticism and the Response to
'Student Writing,""Although teachers are a rather conservative lot,

they seem to have responded to post-structural theory with a
surprising calm,even general acceptance..."(White 186). The anti-

foundational epistemology in post-structuralism has come to the
forefront of composition just as social constructionist rhetoric has.
Just as Classical logocentric rhetoric or the formalism of Aristotle is
not acceptable in a writing classroom,so isn't the current-traditional

pedagogy. As we will see in chapters two and three,compositionists
have had to be open to new ways of thinking and teaching.
Finally,Joseph Petraglia's exploratory work on the nature of
"rhetoric as epistemic," suggests that there are four processes that
provide the basis of social construction in composition(39). They are
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"Real entities('reality')include knowledge, beliefs, truths, and
selves... All reality is arrived at by consensus... Consensus,and thus

knowledge is'discovered'solely through public discourse(rhetoric)...
Reality changes as consensus changes." This anti-foundational

epistemic rhetoric is typical of the dialectic against the legacy of
Classical foundational rhetoric as well as the social norms that it

contained including patriarchy and Euro-centrism. Composition
studies has grown up with the feminist and civil rights movements
and so Petraglia's inclusionary epistemic rhetoric, within this new

tradition,is responding to the exclusionary hegemony oftraditional
absolutist rhetoric and the typical white male ideas that it reified.
In these five exploratory attempts to define both epistemic
rhetoric and its contemporary vehicle of social constructionism,a
trend appears, as Jim W.Corder suggests,to talk about"a new"

rhetoric or "the new"rhetoric"(162-163). I agree that this trend
exists, butI don't see epistemic rhetoric as "the new" rhetoric

because epistemic rhetoric has a legacy that goes back to the
dialectical opposition ofPlato and the Sophists. Although the
dialectical assumptions have changed from a foundational to an anti-

foundational epistemological base,this rhetoric remains epistemic
and consequently is not new. The epistemological conclusions may
be new,but the idea of a knowledge creating and/or discovering
rhetoric is not. The explorations of Bruffee and other

interdisciplinary social constructionists may make epistemic rhetoric
seem like it is new,but as Robin Vamum points out,this sort of
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"new" talk robs us of our generations,our rhetorical legacy(39-40).
As I will show in chapters two and three,this explofartory group has
still notcome to terms with the historical dialectic of epistemic

rhetoric,and therefore using social constructionism as the definition
for Bruffee's idea of an epistemic rhetoric does notrespond to the
meta-level definitional needs as effectively as the work of Berlin or
Fulkerson.

James Berlin'sIdeological Approach

James Berlin's work on rhetoric has brought epistemic rhetoric

to the forefront ofcomposition studies more than any other single
contemporary scholar,and his work on composition theories in 1982,
1987,and 1988 has not overlooked the rhetorical legacy. His
taxonomies have focused on the ideological and epistemological
characteristics ofrhetoric,and since he himself was an anti-

foundational Marxist,his works have interpreted epistemic rhetoric
from a the social constractionist Marxist view.

Inherent in James Berlin's understanding and descriptions of
rhetorical theories is Kuhn's idea of paradigm shifts as well as
Foucault's idea of the episteme. Berlin writes in his history of
writing instruction in the twentieth century entitled Rhetoric and

Reality,"While one particular rhetorical theory may predominate at
any historical moment,none remains dominant over time... the

difference has to do with epistemology"(3). Berlin documents how
epistemological assumptions and the episteme have changed in
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composition studies throughout the century, but most importantly

since the 1960s. Berlin writes in 1987 that,"In considering the
rhetorical theories of the period I have chosen epistemology rather
than ideology as the basis of my taxonomy"(6). But one year later,

in his landmark article "Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class,"
Berlin choses to taxonomize ideologically. Let's first look at the
epistemological taxonomy.

Berlin divides the rhetorical history of writing instruction in

Rhetoric and Reality into three epistemological areas: objective,
subjective,and transactional. The objective rhetorical theory is a
positivistic rhetoric that in a contemporary light is seen as currenttraditional,formalist,or cognitive psychological. The subjective

rhetorical theory, because it sees knowledge coming from the
individual,is essentially expressivistic. Transactional rhetorical
theory, because it sees knowledge coming from "an interaction of the
subject and object or of the subject and audience or even of all the

elements - subject, object,audience,and language - operating
simultaneously,"(15)is essentially epistemic rhetoric.
Within the transactional or epistemic category,"Rhetoric exists
not merely so that truth can be communicated: rhetoric exists so

that truth many be discovered ...and constructed"(165). In other

words,Berlin recognizes that epistemic rhetoric enacts the
foundational/anti-foundational epistemological dialectic, the
Platonic/Nietzschean dialectic, that we will discuss in detail in

chapter two. Berlin asserts,"Epistemic rhetoric holds that language is
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the key to understanding the dialectical process involved in the
rhetorical act. Knowledge does not exist apartfrom language"(166).
Epistemic rhetoric consists of both Plato's dialectical discovery of
foundational definitions as well as discourse communities'
construction of anti-foundational definitions. In "Rhetoric and

Ideology in the Writing Classroom," Berlin describes this dialectical
division within epistemic rhetoric as "psychological epistemic" on the
Platonic side, and "social epistemic" on the social constructionist or

discourse community side(489).
Berlin traces the roots of social-epistemic rhetoric, within the
the transactional epistemology,in the 1950s and 1960s to Harold
Martins,Richard Ohmann,Kenneth Burke,and others,^d then in the

1970s and 1980s to Kenneth Pike, Alton Becker,Richard Young,
Kenneth Bruffee, Ann Berthoff,Paulo Friere,Hans Guth,Fredric

Jameson,Richard Rorty,Michel Foucault,David Bartholomae,Patricia
Bizzell, C.H. Knoblauch,Lil Brannon,and Maxine Hairston(Rhetoric

and Reality 165-189). What holds all these scholars,the emerging

epistemic rhetoric discourse community,together? According to
Berlin, what unifies them is a belief that:

Meaning emerges notfrom objective,disinterested,empirical
investigation, butfrom individuals engaging in rhetorical
discourse in discourse communities - groups organized around
the discussion of particular matters in particular ways.
Knowledge,then,is a matter of mutual agreement appearing as
a product ofrhetorical activity, the discussion, of a given
discourse community.(166-167)
As noted earlier, many of these epistemic rhetoriciansjust

listed, and who follow this social constructionist pattern of self
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definition, are the same scholars that were part of what I termed the
exploratory group. The beauty ofBerlin's analysis ofepistemic
rhetoric over the exploratory group's analysis,is that he sees it as
part of a rhetorical legacy as well as a rhetoric that can be defined

and understood through the meta-level ofideology. Ideology,like
theory or philsophy,acheives the desired meta-level,a meta-level in

this thesis meaning a composition approach that minimally takes in
to account pedagogy,epistemology,and procedure. Berlin also
understands,unlike the exploratory group who unite predominantly

around the social constructionist epistemology,that transactional
rhetoric, or epistemic rhetoric,can be seen from both foundational

and anti-foundational points of view,just as 1 have defined it. Berlin
of course is in the anti-foundational camp.

In the 1988 article,"Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing
Class," Berlin does not abandon epistemological taxonomies
altogether, but he decides thatideology clarifies the taxonomy
claiming that,"rhetoric is regarded as always already ideological"

(477). And as we will see when we analyze Fulkerson,Berlin,like
Fulkerson,saw that in taxonmizing composition studies a meta-level
would have to be sought. Fulkerson chooses theory over philosophy,

whereas Berlin chooses ideology over epistemology. Berlin explains
this evolution in his thinking by writing that ideology "addresses
three questions: What exists? What is good? What is possible?"
(479). Within this framework,ideology includes and supercedes
epistemology because "What exists" takes on the question of what

26

counts as knowledge. In addition,(and this is where the meta-level

clarity comes in)ideology encompasses both "What is good," which
addresses the ethical and aesthetic issues,and "Whatis possible,"

which addresses issues of expectation and power. In this article,
Berlin uses the same three categories, objective, subjective, and

transactional, but because he focuses more on the contemporary
pedagogical and procedural practices of these ideologies than on their
epistemological aspects, he calls objective rhetoric "cognitive
rhetoric," subjective rhetoric "expressionistic rhetoric," and

transactional rhetoric "social epistemic." Social epistemic,as we saw
with Bruffee and the exploratory group,is the dominant
contemporary expression of epistemic rhetoric.

According to Berlin,social-epistemic rhetoric is "grounded in

language" and "is located in the relationship that involves dialectical

interaction of the observer,the discourse community(social group)
in which the observer is functioning,and the material conditions of

existence"(488). Knowledge consequently is "an historically bound

social fabrication rather than an eternal and invariable phenomenon"
(489). Social-epistemic rhetoric consequently sees knowledge as
created, not discovered, but it is created within the same tradition as

the neo-Platonic epistemic rhetoric where knowledge is seen as
discovering an external and eternal truth. (Berlin calls this

psychological epistemic). Berlin adds that,"in studying rhetoric—the

ways discourse is generated—we are studying the ways in which
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knowledge comes into existence,"(489)hence the continual
dialectical nature ofepistemic rhetoric.

Berlin may recognize the existence of a foundational epistemic
rhetoric, but he sees it as almost obsolete in light of the current

historical dialectic and the current anti-foundational paradigm of
composition studies. Marginalizing foundational epistemic
rhetoricians divides the composition practitioners into those who

align themselves with Berlin's ideological and social constructionist
theory,and those who are not part of this discourse community.

Consequently he contributes, with his ideological definitions,to the
inclusionary/exclusionary tensions that I will discuss in chapter
three. Although I personally like Berlin's point of view on epistemic
rhetoric,he can be very alienating to people who don't see rhetoric

and rhetorical taxonomies as inherently political. But iflanguage has
always expressed power, whether Plato's or Berlin's,the ideological
nature ofrhetoric's use can never be escaped. Berlin not only

understands the hegemonic aspects oflanguage, but he is able to
analyze and articulate linguistic hegemony. For compositionists who

would rather not have their hidden pedagogical,procedural,or
epistemological agendas analyzed,Berlin can be a threat. But as

stated earlier,to understand Berlin we must appreciate that
paradigms shift,and the epwteme changes. Change can be a threat
to some compositionists, but most realize that change is one of the
only constants in the field.
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If Berlin may be accused of being too exclusive,Richard
Fulkerson may be accused of being too inclusive, and too much
mclusivity may fail to provide definitions as well as mask the

conflictive nature in any discoiu-se community. Yet despite that,1
think that Richard Fulkerson has created the most complete and
inclusive paradigm for understanding the current paradigms in
composition studies.

Richard Fulkerson's Theory Approach
Bringing more clarity to the taxonomizing of composition

studies than anyone before him,Richard Fulkerson proposes,"as a
disciplinary paradigm that a'theory'of composition would include
four components,of which what 1 once called a'philosophy'is only

the first component'(410). Although there is a breadth to the
exploratory social constructionist definitions from scholars like

Bruffee,and there is an attractive power to the ideological definitions
of Berlin,1 think Fulkerson's theory paradigm provides a schema
that can fully taxonomize any composition practice, notjust epistemic
rhetoric.

The first and the most definitive of the four components in
Fulkerson's theory based definition is "axiology," a value theory for
what constitutes good writing. The axiology is concerned with the

ends, whereas the next three components of Fulkerson's paradigm
are the means to achieving these ends. The means are procedural,
pedagogical,and epistemological. As was discussed earlier, the
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procedural component concerns how writers create texts or how they

should create texts. The pedagogical component concerns how a
teacher should design curriculum and what modes ofinstruction

would be the best. The epistemological component concerns what
counts as knowledge or how knowledge is made. Fulkerson

"maintain(s)that these four elements are both necessary and
sufficient for a theory ofcomposition"(411).
In differentiating the ends of any composition theory from the

means to achieve those ends,Fulkerson's logic clarifies the muddled
approaches that were seen in both the exploratory and ideological
approaches,as well as the earliest approaches that used only one of
the components of epistemology,procedure,or pedagogy,to define a

composition theory. Fulkerson, with his ends and means approach,
tries to prove that,"Composition studies has moved toward a
homogeneity ofpurpose within diversity of method"(411). In other
words.Composition practioners have reached a consensus on the
ends,but not the means to achieve those ends. Fulkerson asserts,

because of a predominance of social constructionists, that

compositionists have chosen the rhetorical axiology,the axiology that
privileges the reader. He asserts that composition has moved away

from the formalist axiology that privileges text, the mimetic axiology

that privileges reality,and the expressivistic axiology that privileges
the writer. In other words,the significant disparities that continue

to exist concern process,pedagogy,and epistemology,and not
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axiology since the consensus in the 1980s and 1990s is for a

rhetorical, or externally based,axiology.

Fulkerson emerges with his ends and means theory after a
mountain ofresearch by scholars like Berlin,Bruffee, and others in

the exploratory group. Initially the procedural, pedagogical,and
epistemological pieces ofthe puzzle were studied and understood.
From these means,the ends could be examined. Fulkerson's 1990

assertion of a commonly practiced and understood end,a rhetorical

axiology,took twenty seven years from the Braddock report's
announcementin 1963 that we knew nothing about how to teach and
research writing.

Intellectually Fulkerson's end and means theory can be quite
satisfying since composition practioners can use Fulkerson's four

components to analyze and implement the axiological,procedural,
pedagogical,and epistemological practices needed to teach a

theoretically consistent and meta-cognitive writing class. Yetin
practical and emotional terms there is a awkward cumbersomeness

in being so precise. Ideological terms,like the ones Berlin uses,seem

to fulfill a more basic need of description. There's something
unsatisfying in a Fulkerson-like answer to the question of,"What's
your composition theory?" A contemporary epistemic rhetorician

would answer something like this: "Well,I'm axiologically rhetorical,
that is I privelege the reader over the writer, text, or reality. I'm
pedagogically environmental,that is to use Hillox's definition that is

essentially based on the structured workshop type of writing class
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(Hillox 20), I'm procedurally process oriented following the cognitive
psychology ofLinda Flower(Rhetoric and Ideology 481),and I'm

epistemologically a social constructionist." This many be an accurate
answer,but itjust doesn't have the power of,"I'm an epistemic
rhetorician." Hiat's concise,and somehow pleasing,even though its
incompleteness has led to many of the current misunderstandings in
composition theory and practice. Certainly Berlin's ideological

terminology has had that brevity.
Although Fulkerson's theory-based paradigm has not offered
brevity,it does allow for the inevitable and probable paradigm shifts
that will occur as composition studies grows as a field.
Compositionists will be able to define themselves within their means
and ends as those means changes to achieve that end,or vice versa.
Epistemic rhetoric, as a term,remains more stable than many terms

in literature and composition. Take for example the literary theories
of"structuralism" or "reader response'" These literary terms,one
older and one newer,represent paradigms of criticism that have

evolved or will evolve out ofexistence. Is that all epistemic rhetoric
will become? Iffirmly established as a composition theory,ideology,
or philosophy, will epistemic rhetoric only represent a
compositionist's stance from the 1970s to the 1990s? Maybe so, but

I hope not. I'm not arguing that all theories are historically situated
and consequently do not have the ability to evolve, but theories that
do not respond to a historical legacy,like the dialectic inherent in
epistemic rhetoric,tend to stagnate and disappear as the paradigms

32

shift. Yet if epistemic rhetoric is seen as an integral part of the

rhetorical legacy,as well as a rhetoric that can change with the times,
then it will survive as an inclusive and timeless term. If it remains a

term simply for social constructionist epistemology and pedagogy,
then it willfade away an an exclusive and historically stagn^it term.
Judging from the historical dialectic that we will examine in chapter
two,epistemic rhetoric is a language centered rhetoric whose
epistemology should be able to change with the times.
So now that we've examined the exploratory group,Berlin's
ideological approach,and Fulkerson's theoretical approach,it's time

to understand if the definition that I earlier offered of epistemic
rhetoric qualifies as both a complete composition theory and as a

rhetoric that responds to its historical legacy.

Analysis OfMy Definition ofEpistemic Rhetoric
My definition,once again,reads as follows:

Epistemic rhetoric - Epistemic rhetoric is a rhetoric that
assumes and teaches that language is the basis for all human
understanding of knowledge,whether foundational or antifoundational,and that effective use and understanding of
language leads to the creation or discovery ofknowledge,
either from or for the self, or from or for the society. Effective
use and understanding of epistemic rhetoric would emphasize
the dialectical, as well as the formalistic, nature oflanguage
and knowledge in relation to the self, society, and what is
perceived to be reality.
Does this definition include the axiological end and the

procedural, pedagogical, and epistemological means that are
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necessary to be a complete theory within Fulkerson's paradigm? In
an inclusive manner of thinking,I think it does.

Although epistemology is at the forefront of this definition
instead of axiology,as Fulkerson would have it, the definition
nevertheless fits within the axiological definitions that would make it

a theory. In post-modem times the perspective on epistemic
rhetoric has axiologically priveleged the audience,reader,or society,
yet my definition also allows for axiologies that could privelege the

three other axiological components,the text, reality, or the writer.
An epistemic rhetorician's axiology would depend on his or her
epistemology, because within epistemic rhetoric there is an

inseparable dialectic between language and knowledge that would
affect an epistemic rhetorician's value theory of what constitutes
good writing or speaking. My definition has allowed for the breadth

of that axiological and epistemological legacy, whether it be a

Classical reality based axiology with a foundational and logocentric
epistemology,or a post-modem reader-based axiology with a antifoundational and socially constracted epistemology.
So,this definition includes Fulkerson's axiological and
epistemological components,but does it also include the procedural
and pedagogical components? In the mostinclusive manner of

thinking, again,I believe it does.
Fulkerson's procedural component is the means by which

writers, or speakers in Classical times, go about creating texts. In
Classical times the procedure for creating texts was codified in
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Cicero's DeInventione ; his five canons of rhetorical composing being
invention,arrangement,style, memory and delivery(Bizzell,

Herzberg 195). Before Cicero,epistemic rhetoric also interpreted
procedure as the Socratic method,the search for definitions,

examining the formalistic nature of speech,and argumentation.In
post-modem times epistemic rhetoric has interpreted procedure
through various pre-writing procedures, which would include
analysis of audience and discourse communities,various draft

creation procedures, which emphasize the process over the product,
and various revision and editing procedures, which would include

peer editing and writers' workshops. Inherent in epistemic
rhetoric's procedure, whether Classical or post-modem,is the
dialectical nature oftext creation and my definition allows for this
procedural component.
As for the pedagogical component,post-modern epistemic

rhetoric has interpreted this through such teaching methodologies as
cooperative leaming and non-hierarchical group discussion. In

Classical times,according to H.I. Marrou,pedagogy would include the
use of both philosophical and rhetorical debate and dialectic(Marrou

194-205). Again,my definition of epistemic rhetoric allows for these
pedagogical components.
And so now,in the most inclusive terms, we have defined

epistemic rhetoric,as not simply a philosophy,a search for truth and
knowledge through language, but as a theory, a set of principles
about tmth and its relation to language and the best methods to
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implement these principles. As a theory,epistemic rhetoric's nature

is completely bound up in the endless dialectical pursuitfor
knowledge and wisdom through language, whether Classical or postmodem.

The definition I have written for epistemic rhetoric defies the

ideological boundaries of taxonomy that Berlin would want,and it

really gives no bibliographic context that Bruffee and the other
exploratory rhetoricians may desire, but I think that it expresses an
inclusiveness that neither Berlin,Bruffee,or Fulkerson would fault

given the rhetoricallegacy that it is trying to encompass. As we will
see in much more detail in chapters two and three, this definition

represents the dialectical nature ofepistemic rhetoric's history,a

history that must be appreciated properly to know and use epistemic
rhetoric as a timeless term.

C.H.Knoblauch,whose work pioneered the epistemological shift
that has been occuring in composition studies, states very clearly,"A
knowledge ofrhetoric can offer those who work in the theory and
teaching of writing two perspectives on their work that they

currently lack,the first philosophical,and the second historical"(27).

Now that we've looked at how epistemic rhetoric has affected
composition studies philosophically through the pursuit for a

defintion, we'll next look at some of the history that creates
epistemic rhetoric's current dialectic. Understanding the definition of

epistemic rhetoric entails understanding its history,the purpose of
chapter two.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL DIALECTIC OF EPISTEMIC

RHETORIC AS CREATED BY PLATO AND NIETZSCHE

Having defined epistemic rhetoric as it relates to contemporary

composition studies, the question now arises of how composition
studies has gotten to the point where social constructionism is seen

as the dominant epistemic rhetoric theory. The contentiousness in
the contemporary definition, as seen in chapter one is representative
of the historical dialectic that has formed our understanding of

epistemic rhetoric. In this chapter I will argue that the parameters
of this dialectic are defined by Plato in Classical times and Nietzsche
in the nineteenth century. Plato represents the definitive
foundational view on language and Nietzsche represents the
definitive anti-foundational view out of which grew the post-modem
bias for social constructionism. Plato and Nietzsche saw rhetoric in

epistemic terms as a vehicle for knowledge,but their assumptions on
whether knowledge is discovered or created and to what truth it

related are entirely different. Plato claims that knowledge is
discovered and relates to an absolute truth. Nietzsche claims that

knowledge is created and relates only to our own dissimulation or
amoral untruth. With Plato on the side of "trath" and Nietzsche on

the side of "lies," their differences epitomize and define the continual

dialectic between truth and language inherent in epistemic rhetoric.
Underlying this argument that epistemic rhetoric has changed
from a foundational to an anti-foundational stance is Foucault's
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concept of the episteme. Before discussing Plato,Nietzsche,and the

historical dialectic that took place in epistemic rhetoric between the
time periods of these two pivotal thinkers,let's revisit Foucault's

thought on how this epistemological legacy has changed.

Foucault's Episteme
In The Order ofThings,Michel Foucault ponders the
epistemological dialectic in Western culture. Foucault uses the
Classical word episteme to describe the "epistemological field" of

Western Culture(xxii). Foucault's concept of the episteme is a post
modernist view of knowledge that does not "describe the progress of
knowledge towards an objectivity"(xxii), but which displays the

basis of a socially constructed field of knowledge from which
Western culture emerged. Foucault continues:

Now,this archaeological inquiry has revealed two great
discontinuities in the episteme of Westem culture; the first
inaugurates the Classical age(roughly half way through the
seventeenth century)and the second,at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, marks the beginning ofthe modem age.
(xxii)

In other words,Plato's Classical episteme was different than
Nietzsche's modem episteme. Yet the episteme,according to
Foucault, that finally and irreversibly changed in Nietzsche's century,
the nineteenth, has its roots in Classical times. Plato and Socrates

assert that the episteme represents tme,or absolute, knowledge~a
knowledge based on archetypes that could only be known by
transcending human existence. Episteme in the Classical sense is
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contrasted to doxa ,which to Socrates and Plato meant mere opinion.
The distinction between episteme and doxa has blurred in the post-

modem episteme,as socially-constructed anti-foundational thought
has emerged as the dominant episteme.,an episteme that has no
absolutes and believes that none have ever existed. The transition

between these episteme took time. My contention is that the

difference in this new emerging episteme was not understood by
philosophers and rhetoricians until Nietzsche,and then by modernist
and post-modernist work,alluded to in chapter one,thatfollowed
Nietzsche. Epistemic rhetoric, as a part of this rhetorical tradition,
has changed as the Classical episteme changed to the post-modem
episteme.

Another aspect ofFoucault's work that will become clearer as
we explore the historical dialectic in this chapter is the concept of
hegemony. The epistemological dialectic has always been
contentious. In Classical times Plato's views won out over the

Sophists. Plato's views were hegemonic,and in their hegemony were

a threat as witnessed by the death ofSocrates. Similiarly,in postmodem times, social constmctionist thought seems to be hegemonic
within rhetoric. I mention this now so that we can keep in mind that

dominance of one thought over another does not mean that the less
dominant thought does not exist. Nietzsche felt the hegemony of
foundational thought when he tried to expand the rhetorical debate
beyond the Platonic and Aristotilian debate about the ethical and
unethical uses oflanguage to the the Platonic and Sophistic debate
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about the epistemological basis ofrhetoric, Foucault also feels the

hegemonic presence in his archaeological histories in that he often
studies more of what is not mentioned than what is mentioned.

I am not going to take on the comprehensive archaeological
history in this thesis that Foucault made his life's work,but now that

we have revisited Foucault's thought we can continue forward in
examining the historical dialectic of epistemic rhetoric. I will begin

my examining Plato's foundational thought. I then will examine the
anti-foundational thought of Nietzsche. I will conclude with a short
discussion of the rhetorical legacy that composition studies is
dependent on and how that legacy influences us today.

Plato's Foundational Thought

Plato defines truth and its relationship to language through
Socrates' voice in Plato's dialogues, most notably in the Phaedrus,
and the "Allegory of the Cave," as an unvarying absolute. Archetypes

of this absolute truth, or forms,are hidden,atleast metaphorically,
in a cave,a cave whose existence we know of before birth and which

we now mustremember in order to transcend back to that heavenly

sanctuary of truth's archetypes. Beauty,particularly in rhetoric,
reminds us ofthis truth and so beauty must be sought after in order
to receive this truth. The transcendent truth exists and is accessible

to humans. The role of the philosopher, or the "lover of wisdom" as

well as beauty(Bizzell 142),is to bring humans to that secret and
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hidden knowledge. Rhetoric and language,therefore, discover pre
existing knowledge.

Rhetoric consequently is a virtuous pursuit. As Karen Burke Le
Fevre writes in "A Platonic View of Rhetorical Invention," "Plato

maintains that virtues(truth,justice,love)do not exist in the

material world,but only in the mind and in the shape ofideal forms:

perfect prototypes ofthe natural world,forming an ideal patternworld of a true,transcendent reality"(1). Ofcourse this sets up a

didactic binary of good and virtuous rhetoric against bad and

virtueless rhetoric,a binary whose relativity was hotly debated until
Nietzsche's definitive response.

This foundational definition of archetypes began the Classical

episteme ,a legacy in which truth is accessed through language, but

is beyond language. Therefore rhetoric's place is to bring the
speaker,through language and dialectic, to the point where he or she
can transcend the limitations oflanguage and receive the truth
through a mystical experience. Often called logocentric thought,

Platonic rhetoric has influenced our ideas oflanguage straight
through to the Scientific Revolution and even beyond to the present
day. For instance,in composition is not the Expressivist idea that a
writer must discover his or her "voice" a transcendent view of truth?

Otis M.Walter, a modem Platonic scholar,condenses Plato's

influence on the rhetoric in four ways:

(1) Ideas are the origins of our values, (2) Most of the
manifestations of our values are imperfect imitations of the
archetypal ideas, (3) Knowledge of the ideas can transform
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individuals and entire nations,and(4) Good communication

must be based on a transforming definition following the
principles already set out.(20-23)

From this point of view,it is clear why Plato did not like the
poets and the Sophists,the anti-foundationalists of Plato's time.
Their beliefs, or doxa, manipulated Plato's truth, a truth of

archetypes, a truth that Plato felt the Sophists and the poets had no
conception of, and therefore had no right to speak and write about.
Plato's hegemonic belief is that philosophy should rule over rhetoric
and not rhetoric over philosophy,as the Sophists and the poets

would have it(Briggs 92). Plato is particularly concerned with the
"transforming" value of knowledge which leads to a Classical dialectic
between the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage.

Plato's dialogues try to create a touchstone of moral absolutism

against the moral relativism that he perceived in the Sophists of his
time. To quote from Bizzell and Herzherg'sT^e Rhetorical Tradition,
"Plato views the Sophists as moral relativists who therefore have no

reason not to be manipulative,deceitful, or downrightcorrupting in
their use of discourse. ButPlato sees himself as didactic, not

manipulative, using discourse to shape his audience for its own good"
(56). Plato believes that the rhetoricians must know the truth to be

able to use the truth in a rhetorical situation. Rhetoric's ability to

persuade must be used to convince people of the Truth,not of a
relative truth, which Plato believed the Sophists practiced.

Persuasion to truth is good rhetoric,Platonic rhetoric, whereas
persuasion to doxa is bad rhetoric, or Sophistic rhetoric.
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Thus Plato defines the long Classical and contemporary debate

about the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage. Many philosophers
and rhetoricians between the time ofPlato and Nietzsche debated

Plato's idea ofthe transforming nature ofethical rhetoric, as well as
the foundational premises of absolute truth, but they always need
relative arguments. Underlying this debate is not only Nietzsche's
idea of dissimulation,(thatis, thatlanguage is a "lie," no truth can
exist in language,language can never be escaped,and therefore there
is no truth), but also the will to power and the will to truth, all of

which we will discuss later.(Briefly explained, will to power is the
basic human drive by which individuals try to subjugate others in
order to prove that their beliefs or accomplishments are the most
worthy. Will to truth is "the desire to locate truth in something other

than discourse"(Bizzell,Herzberg 1126).) Plato's dialectic with the
Sophists was not completely understood until Nietzsche responded to
the unstated and underlying assumptions behind Platonic

foundational belief: If rhetoric c^ deceive for"good" and for "bad,"
then rhetorical language must in itself be deceptive. In other words,
how do we know the truth when we can use language not only to
deceive others for their own good,but also to deceive ourselves?
Platonic epistemic rhetoric chose to overlook this issue, and chose

instead to debate the ethical and unethical uses oflanguage.
Nietzsche saw the idea of deception behind this ethical and unethical
debate and this pushed him to declare his anti-foundational beliefs

in response to Plato's foundational claims. As Foucault wrote,the
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episteme,notjust the doxa ,has changed. We can believe ourselves

out of being deceived, but we can't think our way out of being
deceived.

Take,for example,the discussion on love in Plato's Phaedrus.

In the Phaedrus Socrates defines good rhetoric as what Nietzsche
would call dissimulation. Plato shows Socrates defining love with his
student Phaedrus from three rhetorical points of view; from the
Sophist Lysias'; from a Sophist-type monologue by Socrates,and

finally, by an exemplary dialectic that purportedly lifts Phaedrus up
to Socrates'level of understanding. Each ofthese rhetorical

discussions are based,as in Plato's Gorgias,on the binary ofdoxa
and episteme ; but only in the third dialectic does Socrates express
that his persuasion is for a truthful good. Persuasion to truth, or
episteme , according to Socrates,is the only ethical or good rhetoric,
a rhetoric that must influence the soul to transcendent trutfis,like
the transcendent non-sexual love of which he tries to tell Phaedrus.

Butfor Nietzsche,none of this talk can be true because language,as
we will discuss later,is only metaphorical and can never be escaped
or transcended. There may be a truth to transcend to, but unlike
Socrates,Nietzsche does not think that language is a way to arrive
there.

In Gorgias,Plato has Socrates debating several Sophists in an
attempt to illustrate what rhetoric should not be. 1 believe the most

important issue discussed in this dialogue,in relation to truth and
dissimulation as well as foundational and anti-foundational truth,is
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when Socrates tells Gorgias that a distinction must be drawn between
"knowledge and belief" or "the true and the probable."(Bizzell,
Herzberg 66) Persuasive rhetoric, according to Gorgias,really only

deals with belief or the probable; but,for Socrates rhetoric and

dialectic must deal with knowledge and certainty. Socrates
acknowledges "conventional truth" and "natural truth" in the affairs
of men such as Gorgias, but he belittles this "popular clap trap" in
favor of transcendent truth (Bizzell,Herzberg 84). Socrates' ultimate

example of how this truth will be played out in our lives for the few
remaining doubters at the end of the diaologue is the truth found in
judgement after death.

But how can any human know this transcendent truth? The
attempts at an answer have v^ed throughout the rhetorical

tradition, starting with Plato's attempts in the Phaedrus; but none
has brought rhetoricians and philosophers closer to any tangible
understandings,and that is where Nietzsche steps in. Dialectic and

rhetoric can never bring us closer to truth because we can not escape

our own rhetoricity. Consequently issues ofethical and unethical
uses of rhetoric continue to be conventional even if we choose to call

these conventions universals. Socrates in Gorgias tries to
demonstrate that conventional and/or natural truths are not

universal or transcendent truths, but even he can not definitively
illustrate and define how rhetoric can do this. We,as humans,can

not escape convention and nature, even if there is ajudgement

waiting for us at death,as Socrates points out to Gorgias. Yet
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Nietzsche as well as many modem epistemic rhetoricians feel that we

can become aware of these conventions that are influencing us. And
so now,I'll turn to Nietzsche's idea of tmth and how that affects the

ideas of a knowledge creating rhetoric,an epistemic rhetoric.

Nietzsche's Anti-Fomdational Thought

The transcendental and absolutist truth that Plato purports was
finally, after more than two thousand years,correctly countered by
Frederich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's 1873 essay "On Truth and Lies in a
Nonmoral Sense" confronts the initial Platonic issues and tensions of

rhetoric: truth/non-truth,language/reality,tropes/is-ness,
self/others, humaness/animalness,intuition/logic, power/knowledge,
subjectivity/objectivity, and ofcourse foundational truth versus

anti-foundational truth, hence epistemic rhetoric. Nietzsche responds
to the Platonic legacy in diametrical opposition,flatly stating that
there is no truth to transcend to through rhetoric. Nietzsche asserts

that all language is metaphorical and consequently is a lie because

language only represents and does not contain the thing of which itis
speaking. Language can not be a medium for truth because language

in its metaphoricalness expresses nothing true or real;language only
represents the signs and symbols that we deceive ourselves with as

human beings. Therefore,language,as a human creation,can never
be transcended. It is a product of our humanness,and we are a
product ofit.
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As Bizzell and Herzberg write in their introduction to
Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense:"

Language,Nietzsche continues,conveys no sensations but'
copies of sensations,' not things butimages of our perception of
things. Words are signs of our impulses and do no represent'a
many sided,respectable knowledge ofthings.' In short,
emphasizes Nietzsche,'language is rhetoric, because it desires
to convey only a doxa,not an episteme.(886)

This assertion finally responds to the dialectic started in the
Phaedrus,the dialectic on what Nietzsche and later Foucault call the

will to truth. Nietzsche thinks that our search for truth is a way that
we as humans, both individually and societally, separate ourselves
fron the is-ness of nature. Nietzsche asserts that this is a stance of

dissimulation, a stance of lies about what constitutes our reality.

Classical rhetoricians thought oflanguage as anthropomorphic,and
consequently language is humankind's greatest societal construct.

Nietzsche concedes the same point, but his conclusion is different.
The difference between the Classic rhetoricians and Nietzsche is that

Nietzsche argues that we only flatter our human egos when we think
this anthropomorphic language construct could lead to truth(On
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense 892). Language is figuration,
and consequently,"there is no unrhetorical'naturalness' oflanguage

to which one could appeal"(885). "The tropes are notjust

occasionally added to words but constitute their most proper nature"
(886).

Nietzsche writes,"The drive toward the formation of metaphors
is the fundamental human drive"(894). This statement makes it
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clear why humans since pre-Classic times have always enjoyed
mythology,storytelling, the reading offiction and poetry, as well as

lingusitics and semiotics. According to Nietzsche, metaphorical
language engages our very humaness, yet on a level that seems
pleasantly intuitive instead of disturbingly logical. Unlike the logical

positivists that preceeded Nietzsche, and who wanted to scientifically
control language in order to bring language to truthfulness, Nietzsche

rejoices in the metaphoricalness oflanguage and his writing style is
highly figurative and aphoristic. Having resigned himself to the
dissimulative trap that his language theory leaves humanity in, he
plays directly with that dissimulation.
According to Nietzsche, humans have an invincible inclination

to be deceived. Accordingly,even Plato deceives himself and others
into believing that there must be an absolutist transcendent truth.
Humans beings,from the Classical period to the present,define lies

as the conscious making of a false or misleading statement. But the

lie that underlies this understanding oflies is that we choose to
believe that language has the capacity to communicate honesty,
knowledge or truth. According to Nietzsche,language never
communicates universals,language only communicates social
conventions; and therefore all language and signs are dissimulation.

The master deception is the intellect, because the intellect can

deceive us into believing anything,such as a quest for truth, a
dramatic play, or that culturally-bound knowledge is universally
true,a trap in hindsight that is true of the Platonic dialogues and
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their relative truth to Greek soeiety. For instance,"Democracy" was
qualified for only non-slave men,a "Truth" we would think of as
preposterous today.

Dissimulation from Nietzsche's point of view is not seen in the
Classical light ofethical and unethical manipulation of the language,
as in the Platonic/Sophistic debate. Dissimulation to Nietzsche is
non-moral,or pre-moral,since dissimulation is the basis for

everything that allows humans to think of themselves as different

from nature. Human language is an anthropomorphic creation; and
so Nietzsche asserts that to think oflanguage and rhetoric as a
vehicle to truth, a human truth,is a lie before nature(889).

Consequently,Nietzsche concludes that all language is metaphor and
metaphors lie. Non-moral lies are the human condition.
It is important to note that the title of Nietzsche's essay is
"Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense." The "Nonmoral Sense" is the

distinction that was not made in discussing truth throughout the

rhetorical tradition,including the Platonic/Sophistic debate from
whatI have read. The rhetorical tradition has always looked at the
ethical and unethical uses oflanguage,as we will see later in the
chapter, but Nietzsche has redirected us back to the basic debate that
Socrates started on whether truth exists or not. Plato and Socrates,

transcending the issue of the ethical use of language,say yes,truth

exists, Nietzsche,transcending the issue of the ethic|al use of
language ,says no,truth can not exist. Both Plato and Socrates knew

that asking whether truth exists or not is not an ethical question,and
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so it is Plato and Nietzsche, both drawing different conclusions,that
define the parameters,the dialectic, of the rhetorical tradition, and
consequently ofepistemic rhetoric.
And so,if all language is figurative dissimulation,then whatis

truth for Nietzsche? Completely in opposition to Plato's ideal of an
absolutist truth,Nietzsche's "truth" is a "rhetorical construction

arising from the creative use oflanguage for the purpose of making
an effective social arrangement"(886). To quote Nietzsche:
"What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors,
metonymies,and anthropomorphisms:in short,a sum of
human relations which have poetically and rhetorically
intensified, transferred, and embellished,and which,after long
usage,seem to a people to be fixed,canonical,and binding.
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they
are metaphors that become worn out and have been drained of
sensuous force,coins which have lost their embossing and are
now considered as metal and no longer as coins"(891)
Before we explore Nietzsche's ideas of truth any further
though,it must be made clear that Nietzsche did not come to the

social constructionist epistemology that is dominant in post-modem
thought. Nietzsche's radical opposition to Plato simply contrasts
Plato's absolute truth with Nietzsche's absolute untruth. In other

words,Nietzsche clarified the epistemic parameters with Plato's
absolute truth on one side and his absolute non-truth on the other.

As a non-absolutist truth, socially constructed tmth compromised
Nietzsche's epistemology. Only later would Foucault clarify Nietzsche

in light of the post-modernist epistemology. Thus Nietzsche
understood a social constmctionist epistemology. Despite seeing it as
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an inter-subjective truth for different discourse communities,

Nietzsche saw social constructionism as an acknowledgment of the
inherent dissimulation in language yet a continuance in the search

for truth just the same,(hence the will to truth and the will to power
enacted by different groups). Nietzsche's rhetorical ideas lead to the

post-modem construct of discourse communities,in which meaning

depends on language,language depends on culture, and knowledge is
socially constructed within interpretive communities. "The "will to
trath" and "will to power",as both Nietzsche and Foucault call it, and

which I will further explore in chapter three,can only occur when
we forget that we are products oflanguage. That is to say,the will to

trath is self-flattery and self-deception. Truth consequently can only

be a "movable host of metaphors, metonymies,and
anthropomorphisms"(891). We think we attain epistemic power by

naming something, butin doing so we only reinforce our
dissimulative views oflanguage and the world. Socrates and Plato,

according to my interpretation of Nietzsche,lead us on a false
rhetorical search. Even if there is a truth to transcend to, as Socrates

proposes in the Fhaedrus,it could never be arrived at through any
construct oflanguage such as rhetoric, dialectic, or the search for

definitions. Our only reality, our only truth,is our own
metaphoricalness.

In Other words,the continual debate from the Classical period
to the present has misinterpreted Plato's basic premise about truth's

relationship to language. It was only Nietzsche who saw through this
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confusion to the basic issue that Socrates and Plato, as deceivers to

good,must have known,but kept a secret because it had no didactic
purpose. As L F. Stone asserts, Socrates believed that truth

transcends language,and he spent his whole life trying to define
truth without success(93). Why could Socrates never define truth?
Nietzsche's answer would be that no one,not even Socrates,could

transcend language. This distinction is one that presupposes any
dialectic on the ethical and unethical uses of rhetoric, and

consequently it clears the philosophical playing field so that modem

and post-modem philosophers and rhetoricians can see the
boundaries beyond the limits of didactic debate.

Nietzsche's Thought as a Social Construction

J. Hillis Miller analyzes how Nietzsche came to his
epistemological conclusions and how Nietzsche's assertions relate to
contemporary ideas of social constractionism. Miller reads

Nietzsche's idea of tmth and its relationship to language like this:
"No proper language exists. The'proper'is already'improper.'
Tmth is therefore grounded in access through the senses to the
essence ofthe thing. Tmth is rather a conventionally agreed
upon set oflies. Tmth is lie not in the sense that it can be
measured as false against some attainable correct naming.
Tmth is lie in the sense that it claims a false grounding in
things as they are, where in fact it's constitutive, not
constative"(318).

In his article entitled "Nietzsche in Basel: Writing and Reading,"
Miller points out that, although Nietzsche was not lead to social
constmctionism as a way to look at tmth,he did come to his ideas
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about the lie of truth in a most social constructionist fashion. In

studying Nietzsche's notes from this time period, Miller points out
that Nietzsche was reading and teaching the Classics in Basel when
the interaction of his own reading and writings. Classical readings
and modem writings,along with his interaction with the students,
led him to his theory ofdissimulation. Nietzsche's theory,that Miller
condenses above,came,in hindsight, as an act of social constmction.
Nietzsche found his anti-foundational views within the dialectic in

trying to teach the foundational views ofPlato to his students in

Basel. In other words,the interpretive community, made up of his
class in Basel,allowed Nietzsche to see that foundational Classical

rhetoric lacked a countering dialectic; Nietzsche thus constructed his
dissumulative anti-foundational theory. (One wonders what Socrates
would have thought if Nietzsche had been his student and not
Phaedms.)

Miller demonstrates that Nietzsche,at the writing of"Tmth and
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," saw that there was no truth, or even

literal language,to transcend to. "Rhetoric as persuasion and rhetoric
as tropes are the same,since all language is tropological and the

tropes persuade. All language is persuasive rather than tmth telling.
All language is primordially rhetorical"(Miller 321). This leads to

the inclusionary/exclusionary problems within epistemic rhetoric

that I will explore in chapter three. If all language is rhetorical, or
naturally persuasive, then positions must be sought and taught in an
anti-foundational rhetoric. This has given rise to discourse
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communities as a way to understand the necessarily relative or
inter-subjective truth.

Post-Nietzschean Epistemic Rhetoric

So where does epistemic rhetoric now stand? According to
Nietzsche,language is rhetoric because it conveys only doxa,not
episteme. This doxa or opinion, which in our blindness stand for

truth,is created not discovered,and then is only relative to each
"herd"(889).(Nietzsche uses "herd" to describe pejoratively what we

think oftoday as discourse communities). Words are signs and these
signs do not,and can not,represent,"a many sided and respectable
knowledge of things,"(886)because language or rhetoric conveys
only opinion and not knowledge. Epistemic rhetoric,from this
extreme Nietzschean view,is figuration that only creates opinion, not

knowledge. Consequently the idea of socially constructed knowledge,
the dominant epistemic rhetoric today, would be part of the middle
ground between Nietzsche's created "lies" and Plato's discovered
"truths."

This will to truth within the legacy ofepistemic rhetoric also
creates will to power,as evidenced in Berlin's ideological definitions

of epistemic rhetoric. Personal and social power are expressed in all

levels oflanguage. Language is persuasive and rhetoric expresses
the will to power. Socrates and Plato express their will to power by
trying to elevate the student through the transforming power of

dialectic and the search for definitions. The will to power is being
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expressed here in the didactic Platonic belief that rhetoric should be
used to persuade for the good. But if rhetoric can be used to
persuade for the good,so too can it be used to persuade for the bad.
This is why will to power is usually thought of as the unethical and

dissimulative part ofrhetoric, but for Nietzsche will to power is
beyond good and evil(Kaufman 179). It is beyond good and evil

because rhetoric can never escape its own rhetoricalness,its own
dissimulation. As the Nietzschean scholar Howard Kaufman asserts,

the will to power is part ofevery language act whether the speaker

believes that his or her language is being used ethically or

unethically(11-12). This will to power,emphasized in the work of
Foucault, who follows in Nietzsche's footsteps, underlies the
inclusionary/exclusionary tension in discourse communities that
epistemic rhetoric sees the world through. We will discuss this

further in the third and last chapter.

The Legacy ofEpistemic Thoughtfrom Plato to Nietzsche
Besides Foucault, many philosophers and rhetoricians have
looked at the epistemological change that has occurred in Westem
thought since Classical times. Berlin writes,"Rhetoric is epistemic

because knowledge itself is a rhetorical construct. Having historical
precedents in Vico,Marx,and a brilliant modem articulation in

Kenneth Burke,this stance argues that epistemology is rhetorical,is

itself a social and historical construct"(Rhetoric and Reality 165).
Knoblauch and Brannon point to the Scientific Revolution as the
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beginning pointfor the change in the episteme(4-5). Numerous
books have been written about the epistemological influences that
have created our modern ideas ofepistemic rhetoric. How and why
did this episteme change? From my point of view,the changes in
epistemic rhetoric have come about as a result of historical social

change,of epistemic change. Nietzsche's idea ofdissimulation
brought social change and,according to Miller, was an act of social
construction.

If Nietzsche's thought was both an act of social construction,as

Miller claims, as well as dependent on the legacy ofrhetorical
thought that proceeded him, who were some of the great thinkers

within that rhetorical legacy that led to the eventual paradigm shift
in the episteme ?

Grateful to Bizzell and Herzberg's The Rhetorical Tradition.,1
have surveyed this legacy, and although 1 don't think it would be
productive to detail each of these rhetorical scholar's influence,1

would like to answer the above question with some of the names
that make up this legacy and whose influence we are a product of.
In Classical times the dialectic was widened beyond Platonic
thought by the Sophists,Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.

Augustine saw the end of this age by arguing for truth over

eloquence, but then Europe found itselfin an anti-rhetorical period,
the Dark Ages or the age offaith.
During the Renaissance,reason,free will, the imagination,and
language as a sign and symbol system became p^ of rhetorical
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discourse once more through Erasmus and Bacon, This was followed
by many great thinkers in the Scientific Revolution and the

Englightenment including Locke and Yico, And the discourse from

the Renaissance to the Enlightenment was not only confined to the
work of male scholars, since earlier feminist rhetoricians like De

Pisan, Cereta,Fell, and Grimke also add to the widening rhetorical
discourse.

Bender and Wellbery,in their bookTAe Ends ofRhetoric, write
that,"To understand the significance of rhetoric today is to
understand why and in what ways it is discontinuous with its past"
(4). Now that we have familiarized ourselves with both the

discontinuity and the parameters ofepistemic rhetoric created by

Plato and Nietzsche,as well as scanning the legacy that came

between them, we can move to chapter three where we will examine
the influence ofepistemic rhetoric on contemporary composition
studies and in particular the inclusionary/exclusionary tension that it
has inherited.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE INFLUENCE OF EPISTEMIC RHETORIC
ON CONTEMPORARY COMPOSITION STUDIES

As I demonstrated in the last chapter,Nietzsche, as Foucault
and others recognize,is the dividing line in rhetorical thought. "The
episteme has changed"(The Order of Things xxii). For over two
thousand years rhetoricians reacted to the Platonic idea of

transcendent absolutist truth. The shift away from the Platonic

legacy began in the seventeenth century with the Scientific
Revolution(Knoblauch,Brannon 51). Yetit was not until Nietzsche,

in the nineteenth century,that a definitive counterpoint argument
was offered to define the dialectical borders ofrhetoric,Platonic

absolutist truth on the foundational or logocentric side,and
Nietzschean dissimulation on the anti-foundational side.

Consequently,in the last one hundred years,the rhetorical debate on
whatconstitutes truth has been wide open as the parameters of

foundational and anti-foundational thought have come to be
understood. Coming out of that ongoing debate,socially constructed
discourse communities have arisen as the dominant vehicle through
which contemporary epistemic rhetoric is understood. In this

chapter I will discuss, expanding from the definitions offered in
chapter one,the influences of socially-constructed discourse
communities on epistemic rhetoric and how their

inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic reflects the contemporary
dialectic in the foundational/anti-foundational episteme. The thesis
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that I will arrive at in this chapter is that the foundational and

exclusionary tensions limit composition studies pedagogically and

epistemologically, whereas the anti-foundational and inclusionary
tensions enable composition studies to more effectively teach writing
and thought.
Before I discuss what a discourse community is exactly,and

how recognition of discourse communities has opened up the far-

reaching issue ofinclusion and exclusion in language,and in
particular composition studies,I need to return to Foucault. In the

last chapter I discussed Foucault's archaeological recognition ofthe
changing episteme in Western culture. I also touched on how
Foucault has expanded on Nietzsche's concepts of will to power and
will to truth. Before I can discuss the dialectical tensions in

contemporary discourse community theory,I need to further clarify
the episteme as a reflection of discourse. Discourse then can be

understood in its relationship to the will to power and will to truth,
two concepts that underlie the discussion in the rest of this chapter
on the influences ofepistemic rhetoric in contemporary composition
studies.

Foucault

In The Order ofThings,Foucault writes that he has concerned
himself"with a history ofresemblance: on what conditions was

Classical thought able to reflect relations of similarity or equivalence
with things"(30). Discourse in Classical times was not a "thing,"
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because discourse was decoration to express pre-existing thought;
but Foucault's work tries to show that discourse is the most

important "thing" because in this thing oflanguage,or discourse,is
displayed both will to power and will to truth. Discourse is not
dressing up ofideas,and rhetoric is not simply about ethical and

unethical eloquence,as in Platonic thought. Discourse is_thought.

Thoughtis a thing. And this thing displays who we are and aren't,
both individually and societally.

Seeing discourse as a real entity,as thought itself, has changed
modem epistemology. Foucault looks at this changing epistemology
from many sides,and sees that the foundational underpinnings of
Classical thought could no longer answer the questions in a changing

Western culture. "Sixteenth-century knowledge condemned itself to
never knowing anything but the same thing,and moreover to know
that thing only at the unattainable end of an endlessjourney"(30).
Foucault further characterizes the Classical legacy that dominated up

until the seventeenth century, by exposing "first and foremost,the
plethoric yet absolutely poverty stricken character of this
knowledge"(30). Foundationalism had led the Classical episteme

into a syllogistic circle of non-generativity.
During the Scientific Revolution,language as a sign system

came into being,and consequently began to recapture its generative
nature as discourse. Discourse,Foucault asserts, became a real thing.

"In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the peculiar existence

and ancient solidity of language as a thing inscribed in the fabric of
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the world were dissolved in the functioning ofrepresentation; all
language had value only as discourse"(43). Foucault calls this

gradual awakening from the Classical legacy,"the an±ropological
sleep" (340-341). Kuhn would describe it a paradigm shift. The
anthropological sleep was not understood as being over until

Nietzsche connected,in his various works,"the philosophical task
with a radical reflection on language"(305). Exposing this

anthropological sleep gave rise to an understanding about will to
power and will to truth that is ever present in discourse.

Bizzell and Herzberg write that,"In The Order ofThings
Foucault remarks that the tendency of Western Philosophy,since the
demise of the Sophists, has been to deny discourse its own reality

and to think of discourse as the dress of thought or the conveyor of
pre-existing meaning. Foucault calls this tendency the'will to truth'"
(1126). The "will to power" goes hand in hand with the will to truth.
The will to power,according to Nietzsche,is a basic human drive that

comes out in gross displays of power,subjugations ofindividuals and
groups,as well as in subtler circumstances like the artists trying to

give order to an otherwise chaotic scene. Language is the dominant
medium for the will to power and the will to truth(886-887).

As I demonstrated in chapter two,we saw that Nietzsche
deconstructed Plato's truth as both the will to truth and the will to

power. Plato's idea of rhetoric, that of didactic persuasion for the

good of the listener,is the will to power and truth exercised and
exhibited. Since Nietzsche's insight, will to truth and will to power
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can be seen as existing in discourse, because discourse is a real thing
that never escapes the basic human drives to display both a will to

truth and a will to power. Found universally in language,these two
forces underpin the inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic that I will be

exploring in contemporary uses and understandings of discourse
communities in composition studies. Understanding the will to truth
means asking, who's truth and for what end? Understanding the will
to power means asking, who's power and for what end?

Foucault asserts that looking at language,discourse,and

discourse communities will answer those two questions about truth
and power. Richard Rorty,in examining the epistemological change
that Foucault has brought about, writes that Foucault "insists that he
wants to question our will to truth, to restore to discourse its

character as an event,and to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier"

(43). An awareness of discourse communities in composition studies
is continuing Foucault's agenda in that discourse can now be analyzed
as the vehicle of knowledge. Examining the various discourse
communities(the signifiers and their sovereignty)is examining their
truth and power claims.
Ofcourse underlying these issues of power,truth, and

discourse is the concept of hegemony,supremacy exercised and
exhibited. Barry Smart in "The Politics of Truth and the Problem of
Hegemony"reads Foucault's work on these themes of will to power

and will to truth as the basis for understanding hegemony,a
continually contentious issue that underlies discourse communities.
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Smart asserts that political analysis can be strengthened by using the
concepts of will to truth and will to powerin conjunction with

linguistic discourse-analysis as a way to deepen our understanding of
the hegemony that is exercised in the language of any discourse
community, i
As I demonstrated in chapter two,the ethical/unethical debate

that pervaded Classical rhetoric has now been replaced by the
foundational/anti-foundational debate. This contemporary debate

reflects the study and understanding,through discourse,of who has

power,who claims truth, and how people use their language to keep
or share that power and truth. Knowing that truth claims,power
claims, and discourse as the source of these claims, underlie any

understanding of discourse communities and socially constructed

thought,I now can discuss contemporary understandings of ties in
composition studies on a less lofty level. I can analyze how discourse

1 These words hegemony,power,truth, and discourse can all be seen
negatively within their binary nature. I don't want to succumb to the
negative interpretation in this chapter. I wantto recognize it, but I want
liberate it and focus more on the productive and progressive side, as Smart and
others do in their work. Humans may be stuck in language, but knowing that
humankind is stuck in language allows hiunans a sense of empowerment.
Certainly most ofthe work in feminist criticism would assert that. And from
both "What is an Author" mdThe History ofSexuality: The Will To Know,
Foucault makes clear that discourse itselfis a signifier' discourse is productive
and inclusionary,and notjust exclusionary. I think it's easy to become
disenchanted with a post-modernist interpretation ofFoucault. Richard Rorty

writes,Foucault's Nietzschean attititude towards the idea ofepistemology is that
these is nothing optimisdc to say"(46). This may be true for some,but I'd
rather not deal with that darker,and possibly even nihilistic,side of discourse
communities as they relate to composition studies. I see xmderstanding
discourse communities, and language as a signifier as Foucault would say,as
part ofthe knowledge making and liberating influence in the modem
interpretation ofepistemic rhetoric.
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communities both limit and enable epistemic rhetoric.

"Discourse"and Discourse Communities

The epistemoiogical basis of understanding in contemporary
epistemic rhetoric is the discourse community. Each of these words,
discourse and community,have different connations by themselves.
By first examining the understanding of discourse,and then examing
the understanding ofcommunity, we can understand how epistemic
rhetoric uses them together.
In defining discourse communities Frank J. Angelo points out
that the word discourse,as it's used in composition studies to denote
the aims, modes,and forms of written and spoken language,should
be separated from the discourse of discourse communities(131).

Discourse, by itself, carries a meaning in the Classical tradition as the
clothing of thoughtinstead ofthought itself. I use discourse in the
post-modern sense in which language and thought are inseparable.

Teaching post-modem discourse in the contemporary epistemic
rhetoric classroom is more than teaching awareness of simple
textual features of a particular writing genre,i.e. the clothing of
thought. Teaching post-modem discourse is demonstrating a way of

thinking and knowing as seen from a particular point of view,i.e.

situated thought. A classicist,say in the footsteps of Aristotle or
Cicero, would be interested in codifying and taxonomizing a
particular genre or discourse. A contemporary epistemic
rhetorician's interest would go beyond that to seeing discourse as a
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way of knowing. Knoblauch and Brannon,in comparing Classical and
contemporary notions of discourse, make the distinction that

contemporary ideas of discourse hold that knowledge is not static

(87). Discourse should be seen as an active knowledge maker or
discoverer, depending on one's epistemological stance. Discourse

represents more than conventions;it represents epistemology,an

epistemology that reflects the knowledge of a particular community.
If, as Knoblauch and Brannon write,"Modem rhetorical theory,

beginning as early as the seventeenth century,finds a closer
connection between language and thought,discourse and knowledge,

than ancient speculation supposed"(4),then in teaching we are using
an awareness of discourse communities to teach thinking as a process

through the medium oflanguage. "Discourse,then,far from having

the restrictive presentational function that the ancient rhetoricians
supposed,actually has a central and generative role in the pursuit of

knowledge"(53). Exploring,sharing,and expanding language,that is

discourse,creates knowledge,and knowledge becomes the basis for a
community of understanding.

"Community"and Discourse Communities
Having clarified the nature ofcontemporary discourse,let's
now examine how the word discourse relates to the word

community.

The word community in discourse community is widely used.
As Joseph Harris writes, the word community "seems never to be
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used unfavorably"(12). Marilyn Cooper, who has used feminist
criticism to look at both the enabling and limiting aspects of
discourse communities,defines discourse community as follows:
A discourse community is characterzized by certain underlying
assumptions,knowledge, values, and interests its members
hold in common and by the use of certain language conventions
- - types of argument,genres,and vocabulary. Academic
disciplines seems to be the prototypical discourse communities,
but professions,corporations,and hobby groups also seem to
qualify.(204)
For instance,the composition studies' discourse community
broadly integrates literature,linguistics, and rhetoric; and within

these disciplines the practitioners have been labeled within the

various communities ofexpressionism,cognitive psychology,social
constructionism or social epistemic rhetoric. In other words,defining
the boundaries of any discourse community is a continually evolving

process,particularly because the language that creates knowledge in
each discourse community never remains entirely static. And so
discourse,in relation to discourse community,can be defined as
representing the socially constructed epistemological base of any

group oflanguage users.
Thomas Kent, a sceptic over the wide acceptance of discourse
communites as a way to understand contemporary academic studies,

describes our current understanding of discourse communities as
either thick or thin.

The thick formulation understands a community to be a system
of social conventions that may be isolated and codified. The
thin formulation understands community to be a chorus of
polyphonous voices. We understand a spectrum of different
uses of the term community;on one end of the spectrum are
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thick formulations that depict a community as a determinate
and codifiable entity, and on the other end are thin
formulations that depict a community as relatively
indeterminate and uncodifiable sedimentation of desires and

beliefs.(425)

Besides codification,identification by the self and others can be

another important way to understand the parameters of any given
discourse community. Erika Lindeman has drawn in this important
concept ofidentification by examing Kenneth Burke's work on

symbols. Lindemann writes that, according to Burke,human beings
are "linguistic animals,using and misusing symbols. Rhetoric is a

function oflanguage which enables human beings to overcome the
divisions separating them"(49). Lindemann defines the difference
between the "old" rhetoric, or Classical rhetoric, and the "new"

rhetoric as a difference between persuasion and identification,
persuasion within the Classical ethical/unethical debate and
identification within the foundational/anti-foundational discourse

community debate. "Identification is a key concept in Burke's theory
ofrhetoric; it explains why human beings act rhetorically on one
another - to promote social cohesion"(49). Discourse communities
are consequently ways ofrelating to others, ways of identification.
The language used in a discourse community provides the cohesive
force that provides an identity for its members.

But identification,codification, and persuasion, within discourse
communities,as Kent,Lindeman,and Burke point out,relies most

importantly on each discourse community's epistemological role.
Identification and persuasion have to do with how community
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members investin the group's epistemology. Identification works
like persuasion in including or excludihg would be members.

Codification has to do with how much power the members have to
influence the group's epistemology.If a group can epistemologicaliy
persuade new members to join within the self-identified and codified
epistemological parameters,then that discourse community is a
"thick" and vibrant discourse community.
Discourse communities as seen from a contemporary

perspective, as Lindman's and Kent's scholarship show,are part of"a
long-time intellectual development,no passing fad ofthe twentieth
century,but a serious reorganization of discourse theory that has
permanently altered the way contemporary rhetoricians view
composition"(Knoblauch,Brannon 57).

According to Foucault,discourse communities are simply a way
to understand a group's regulated ways of speaking,and this is an
important diagnostic tool in analyzing the rhetoric ofthe various
discourse communities. Foucault also asserts that the birth of

foundationalism occured when regulated ways of speech were no
longer thought of as social fabrications, but as the reality ofany

particular group or society. Foundationalism began,according to

Foucault,in the fifth century B.C.of Classical Greece as a fallacy

within the will to truth(Cooper 206). Socrates, as a person who
intimately knew that language could persuade for both the good and
bad,could well have been aware of this fallacy when he was defied
in his search for archetypal or foundational definitions. As we saw in
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chapter two,seeing through this fallacy and recognizing antifoundational thought is the way that Nietzsche responded to teaching
Socratic thought.
Marilyn Cooper asserts that discourse at its root is anti-

foundational because of its specificity to each time,place, and
community. "The reality of discourse is characterized by its
discontinuity, which is to say that it is not grounded in any 'original,'
'true'language" or discourse(207). Discourse is neither external nor

internal, objective nor subjective. It's intersubjective, or as I quoted
Berlin in chapter one of this thesis, discourse is transactional.
I can go no further in discussing discourse communities as the

dominant vehicle for contemporary epistemic rhetoric without
briefly introducing the influence of Stanley Fish,since,as Gary Olson

in ih& Journal ofAdvanced Composition claims,Stanley Fish has
been one "of the principal intellectual sources of social
constructionism"(Olson 253). Stanley Fish has been called "The

Contemporary Sophist" because "he sees an affinity between Sophism
and the anti-foundational project he has so long championed"(253).

Fish is aware of, and a part of, the rhetorical legacy and dialectic. He

"has always insisted that rhetoric is central, that it's the'necesssary
center,' that substantial realities are products of rhetorical,
persuasive, political efforts"(253).

Although Fish has not been busy building theoretical
paradigms like Berlin or Fulkerson,he has contributed greatly to the
theory building in contemporary composition studies. Fish argues
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that interpreting discourse communties in composition studies,just
like interpreting fiction in literary studies,is becoming a necessary
skill, but that the history and influence ofdiscourse analysis and/or
rhetorical analysis has up until now been only minimal. In Fish's
hook Doing What Comes Naturally,Fish addresses some ofthese

issues,and theory makers influenced by his work contend that
composition studies has a long way to go.Part of the problem in
discourse analysis as well as for epistemic rhetoric,is that, as Jim W.
Corder asserts in College English,there are innumerable numbers of
discourse communities which are in constantflux(168). Rhetoric,

whether old or new,has not yet developed the tools to deal with all

these fluctuations,and so the work ofFish in deepening our
understanding of anti-foundational thought as well as rhetorical
analysis is invaluable to epistemic rhetoric.

Discourse Communities and Epistemic Rhetoric in the Classroom

So,if discourse communities are knowledge creating
communities,then how do they limit and enable epistemic rhetoric,
and composition studies, both pedgagogically and epistemologically?
The epistemological awareness and analysis of discourse

communities has caused composition studies to radically change its

pedagogy. As I began to show in chapter one,epistemic rhetoric,as a
composition theory, has responded to these changes. Realizing that

academic discourse communities exist, progressive teachers have
researched and reflected on the ways they could make students both
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aware of the existence of discourse communities and knowledgeable

enough to make a successful entry into these,primarily academic,
discourse communities.

Discourse community analysis in writing classes has become a
very important tool of empowermentfor university classrooms. For
most students, particularly with an epistemic rhetorician for an
instructor,freshman English has become an initiation into the surface
levels of the academic discourse community. Patricia Bizzell writes,

"Writing teachers,then, have seen the lack ofshared discourse as a
problem and have to remedy the problem by studying ways to
initiate all students into academic discourse"(Beyond Anti-

Foundationalism 661). Teaching students, who come from various
discourse communities,that the university represents a singular

academic discourse community is a starting place. It also can be
naive,since "academic discourse is more unstable that this - more

fraught with contradiction, more polyvocal ~ and this instability is a

sign of health,its ability to adapt to changing historical conditions"
(663). In other words, within the larger discourse ofthe university,
there are many different academic discourse communities,each with

its own level ofdiversity and vibrancy. But without daunting
students,thinking of university as the academic discourse

community has been an empowering starting point for epistemic
teachers. An entry point has to found somewhere. The issues of
polyvocality and exclusion will become evident and can be dealt with

after the students have been included into at least the first layer of
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university discourse. Epistemic teachers need to dialogue with

students so that their students can find an entry point. The
hegemonic will to power and will to truth in the university is quite

intimidating to the average freshman,but if epistemic rhetoric is a
knowledge discovering or creating rhetoric, then the epistemic

classroom will provide the heuristics and critical language base for
entry into the discourse communities of choice.

Pedagogical changes that address discourse communities have
included basic writing programs to facilitate entry into the academic

discourse community,the use of peer tutoring and writing centers to
continue to deepen that entry,and writing across the curriculum
programs in order to give ±e writing student some specialized
knowledge in his or her chosen academic discourse community.

Before we look at these structural changes in writing programs that
have come about out of an awareness of discourse communities, we

need to look at the role that collaborative leaming has had on
epistemic rhetoric.

Collaborative leaming,also sometimes know as cooperative

learning, has been one ofthe main pedagogies to both deal with the
problem of entrance into the academic discourse community and to
deepen an understanding of that discourse once entry has been

attained. Kenneth Bruffee, along with others in the exploratory
group that we looked at in chapter one^ has championed collaborative

leaming in several articles. These articles align themselves with his
research on social constructionism and consequently on how
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collaborative learning has become an important pedagogical tool of
epistemic rhetoric. Starting with the supposition that"We can think
because we can talk, and we think in ways we have learned to talk"
(Conversation 641),Bruffee takes Stanley Fish's idea ofinterpretive,
or discourse,communities and integrates them with Richard Rorty's
concept of normal and abnormal discourse. Normal discourse

"applies to conversation within a community of knowledgeable
peers,"(642)and "mastery of a knowledge community's normal
discourse is the basic qualification for acceptance into that
community"(643). Consequently,Bruffee feels that the educational

implications for a social constructionist rhetoric, or an epistemic

rhetoric, are,"Conversation, Collaborative Learning,and 'Normal
Discourse'"(641). Once these are mastered,then students can be

aware of and take in,"Knowledge generating discourse," or abnormal
discourse(647).

Rorty's normal discourse is that which is conducted within an

agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant

contribution, what counts as answering a question, what counts as
having a good argument or a good criticism of it. Abnormal

discourse,on the other hand,is what happens when someonejoins in
the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or who sets them

aside. Abnormal discourse can produce both nonsense and
intellectual revolution. Bruffee,in his article with the revealing title,
"Writing and Reading as Collaborative Social Acts," sees abnormal
discourse in well-facilitated collaborative learning as both a way to
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find entrance into a discourse community and as a way to create

knowledge within that discourse community. In addition, Stanley
Fish contends that an epistemic pedagogy would include

collaborative work in situatedness,code switching,and using
different language registers(Olson 259). Fish,like Bruffee,also
appreciates that "abnormal discourse can be a catalyst ofchange," an

important pedagogical tool(260). Collaborative learning provides the
pedagogical environmentfor students to access this transforming
knowledge.
Writing across the curriculum is also an important pedagogy
that deals with discourse communities. David R. Russell, who has

researched the history and legacy of writing across the curriculum
programs in composition studies, writes "Ideally cross-curricular

writing instruction would initiate students into the discourse ofa

professional community and give them extensive experience in

negotiating the discourse of other communities,other disciplines"
(Russell69). He also asserts that writing across the curriculum
programs confront the epistemological issue of discourse on an
institutional level. Russell complains that without these programs,
most writing teachers are co-opted into the university's "myth of

transcience"(66). The myth of transcience means that basic writing

programs, writing across the curriculum programs,and writing
classes that emphasize entrance into the academic discourse
communities are seen as only a temporary part of the university's
mission,and not the primary part. In other words, when the student
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body gets "up to the appropriate university level," then these

remediating programs can be scrapped. The myth of transcience
does notrecognize that the university's contemporary mission is to
open itself to the wider reality of ail the various discourse
communities. Writing across the curriculum programs,particularly
epistemic ones,fight against the myth of transcience as well as the
university's privileged hegemony and exclusionary discourse.

Episteiruc writing across the curriculum programs enable students to

acquire the normal discourse and eventually add to the abnormal
knowledge-generating discourse. Discourse community entrance,
acceptance, and knowledge generation for the contemporary student

is the core of the university's mission(that is from an epistemic
rhetorician's point of view)whether this epistemological and

pedagogicalmission is acknowledged or not by the university power
structure.

Inclusion,Exclusion,and Discourse Communities
The tension of whether to include or exclude students as a

university mission brings me back to the all-important and
underlying theme in this chapter, and for that matter this whole

thesis. Discourse,contemporarily debated from foundational and

anti-foundational views,is bound up in a continuing
inclusionary/exclusionary dialectic. Having explained discourse,
discourse communities,and some of the pertinent epistemological
and pedagogical issues,I'll now look at the foundational and anti

75

foundational tensions and how they exclude and include writers and
thinkers from and into discourse communities. From there I'll be

able to discuss how this tension both enables and limits the legacy of
epistemic rhetoric as a composition practice.
Discourse communities can be defined as groups of"people who
are more or less equals and agree upon values(Clark 68). Clark,
author of"Rescuing the Discourse Community," asserts that there is a
problem in this sort of definition or any definition of discourse

communities," founded primarily upon shared commitment to
common principles or even to common projects"(65). Composition

studies likes to think of discourse communities as a way of

understanding the power of democracy and as a way to enter into its
power. But according to Marilyn Cooper,teachers that insist that
students confine themselves to the value,language,and genres of the

academic discourse community "will effectively withhold power
within academic discourse from students who come from a different

generation, a different ethnic background,a different race,a

different sex,a different economic class" than the hegemonic
majority of the university(Cooper 219). These teachers will present
their view of academic discourse as a discourse that is foundational

with no room for knowledge-generating abnormal discourse or

possibly even for entry by their students. On the other hand,if we
invite students to understand and participate,as epistemic rhetoric
and its transactional epistemology advocate,then we will include
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students with our anti-foundational, but community-regulated, view
of discourse.2

Some scholars,like Joseph Harris who has researched
collaborative pedagogies,are concerned about construing the words
"consensus" and "community," particularly because consensus is the
avowed aim of many in collaborative learning groups. Harris
contends that communities seldom reach consensus. The word

community may describe the social and linguistic fabric that a group
may share, but it does not denote complete epistemological

agreement within this group. However,Harris concedes that,"Our
aims and intentions in writing are thus not merely personal,
idiosyncratic, but reflective of the communities to which we belong"

(The Idea of Community 12). That is, writing and speaking are social,

and consequently anti-foundational acts. Instead of depending on
consensus as a way to describe any discourse community or

collaborative group,Harris suggests the use of words like "discourse,

language,voice,ideology, hegemony," to describe the contentious
language and contradictions in any academic grouping (20). Harris
asserts that the word community should only be used to denote the

physical entity,including the people we directly associate with on a

daily basis.
2Pedagogically, yet not epistemologically,this could even be true of the
epistemic, yet foundational,legacy going back to Socrates. Socrates used dialectic,an
inclusive pedagogy,to discover knowledge^ thus enabling the student to acquire
knowledge, but limiting the scope of that knowledge.
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Greg Meyers, who has written on collaborative learning,also
falls into this skeptical group. Meyers writes "we should not let our
enthusiasm for this social view lead us to accepting social
construction ofknowledge as something good in itself"(171). Social
construction ofknowledge must be questioned and examined closely
to be vibrant and enabling. Meyers makes the point that consensus

may notreflect "reality" and that composition practioners need "to
decide whether the groups in our classes are introducing students to
new communities,or are confining them in ideologocal structures"

(166-167). In other words,teaching collaborative learning can
reinforce the exclusionary nature of discourse communities,or

collaborative groups can become so inclusive that they are not
capable of generating any meaningful knowledge. Meyers and Harris
are responding to a fear offoundationalism that the word

community,when used in discourse community,could denote if the
collaborative process does not avail itself of the continual and well-

examined social construction ofknowledge. In addition to Meyers
and Harris, Marilyn Cooper also wams of this non-generative
exclusion that can take place in discourse communities in her well

titled article,"Why Are We Talking About Discourse Communities?

Or,Foundationalism Rears Its Ugly Head Once More."
Part of the foundational problem is what Kenneth Burke calls

the "terministic screen"(Grammar 59). Edward Schiappa,a social
constructionist, melds this Burkean concept with Kuhn's idea of a
paradigm. Schiappa writes,"Once a given discourse community(such
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as an academic discipline)employs a particular set of terms
consistently over time to describe particular aspects of experience,
the terms tend to perform a filter-like function by directing attention
to some aspects of the 'objects' under study and not to others"(415).

If this continues,the discourse community will bring itself to crisis,
and eventually to a paradigm shift, because of its insularity. A
vibrant discourse community must engage in what Bruffee,Fish,and
Rorty call abnormal discourse, that is knowledge making and
knowledge questioning discourse. In other words,a vibrant

discourse community is epistemic,and that means anti-foundational.
Yet even anti-foundationalists find themselves in the

uncomfortable position ofrepresenting the academic discourse
community,which to students from the outside can seem

foundational and exclusionary. Despite that,Patricia Bizzell in
"Beyond Anti-Foundationalism" sees this hegemonic stance as an
opportunity to reshape the university into an anti-foundational and

progressive institution, yet still short of a nihilistic post-modem
nowhere. She calls for the following:
"I can invite everyone to join seriously in a rhetorical process
for articulating an alternative to which many of us can agree.
This process will be a risky business; it will require arguing
about what we should read and write, arguing about what
canon we want to endorse instead of pretending we can will
away the power ofcanons. It will require ideological avowals
very uncongenial to anti-foundationalist philosophers. ButI'm
just not willing to concede yet that the smirk of skepticism is
all we academics, or we Americans,can achieve in the face of

the present crisis in our communal life"(674).
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Bizzeil's point of view represents the feeling of the various
movements in composition that have created curricula within

feminism, multi-culturalism, and writing across the curriculum
programs,vibrant and meaningful programs, but programs that are

often not understood or supported. For instance, David R.Russell
points out that writing across the curriculum not only supports the
anti-foundational view inherent in generative discourse
communities, but also that its structure threatens the foundational

power that the university, or its academic discourse community,

wants to maintain. Socially contructed discourse communities

inherently involve change,and that change can be threatening
particularly for those who feel they are excluded by the community's
discourse. Russell continues:

"Cross-currcular writing instruction has never made a
permanent impasse on academia for two structural reasons.
First,it resisted the fundamental organizing principle of
modem academia,the compartmentalization of knowledge.

Second it upset the usual methods ofregulating access to
coveted social roles by challenging the convenient assumption
that writing is a single, generalizable skill,learned(or not
learned)outside a disciplinary matrix"(Russell 53).
As we have seen though,the ideal of a uniform academic

discourse community has been broken down into so many areas that
writing across the curriculum can only begin to address all the

epistemological and pedagogical concerns. Discourse, particularly
academic discourse,is anything but constant and uniform,and the
university is a perfect example of the variety of truths and ways of
making knowledge that exist.
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Yet to the freshman student^ who has no epistemic instructor to

aid in acquiring the discourse ofthe various disciplines,it does not
seem that way. The university can be a monolith ofexclusion,and

this exclusionary tension must be fought against by an epistemic and

inclusionary curriculum. Hence my thesis for this chapter: the
foundational and exclusionary tension limits, but the anti-

foundational and inclusionary tension enables.
If discourse communities become foundational and their

normal discourse goes unquestioned, a tension emerges,a tension
that many composition practitioners have become aware of and have
tried to loosen with the interjection of abnormal discourse that caii
create knowledge and/or a paradigm shift. A foundational discourse

proves to be excluding because anyone who has not mastered the
normal discourse will not be allowed to enter. A discourse

community that engages in both foundational-normal discourse and

anti-foundational-abnormal discourse will be a more inclusionary
than exclusionary discourse community because people within and
on the margins of the discourse community can use the abnormal

discourse as an avenue ofentrance or for knowledge creation
through the influences of both. In fact,finding a balance, and
consequently a productive tension, between inclusion and exclusion
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will make the most vibrant and generative discourse community.3
An established "discourse community is a way ofregulating
who has access to resources, power,even to discourse itself, and it

creates gatekeepers to make sure that the right people get in and all
others are excluded," writes Marilyn Cooper(205). Cooper continues,

"The concept of discourse community is like the concepts of Standard
English and cultural literacy"(205). If discourse is left unexamined,

this is true, so an enabling role that epistemic rhetoric must take is to
examine these discourse communities and understand their

exclusionary nature so that they can be made more inclusionary if
desired. Marilyn Cooper calls this "a hermeneutic rather than a
foundational way" oflooking at discourse communities(205). This

hermeneutic quality is representative of both the knowledge making
quality of discourse communities and the dialectic that exists in

epistemic rhetoric, both in its history and in its constant selfdefinition. As I demonstrated in chapter two,Nietzsche went back to

the Platonic dialogues to show us that the foundational/anti
foundational dialectic, and not the ethical/unethical dialectic, was at
the heart of rhetoric. Since Nietzsche,Foucault and others have

3 Take for the example the different discourse used by Congress and the C.LA.
Congress has both normal and abnormal discourse and the country as a whole can feel
relatively included in the political debate. The C.LA runs on a code of exclusionary
normal discourse,and the public and even Congress have difficulty finding entry in the
discourse ofthe C.LA.in order to debate it's purpose and outcomes. The C.LA has little
tolerance for abnormal discourse. The C.LA. has a restricted and foundational discourse,

whereas Congress has an evolving and anti-foundational discourse.
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brought us forward to further understand that same dynamic in

greater depth. Discourse communities,as part of that legacy, and as

the touchstone of modem epistemic rhetoric,represent that dialectic,

a dialectic that ifleft unexamined will bring us back to a
foundational way of thinking,knowing,and exercising power.

Beyond Hegemony in Discourse Communities

Scholarship that examines this hegemony is coming from
people who are both inside and outside of traditional academic

discourse. In my opinion though,the most interesting work has
comefrom the points of view offeminist writers and people of color,
groups that have deeply experienced their exclusion from the truth
and power claims of our predominantly white patriarchal culture.

For instance,David Theo Goldberg demonstrates how racist
discourse is socially formed. "In a field of discourse like racism what

is generally circulated and exchanged is not simply truth, but Cruth

claims or representations. These representations draw their efficacy
from traditions,conventions,institutions, and tacit modes of mutual

comprehension"(298). As Plato was aware,any discourse,including
racist discourse,rises out of values,and as these values change so
does the discourse. Racist discourse will try to hide under the guise

offoundational values, but as Goldberg points out,it's through antifoundational and multi-cultural understandings that racism can be
exposed. "To succeed in dissolving racist discourse,then the

opposition must assume suitably diverse forms"(313). Epistemic
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rhetoric, as a questioning and knowledge creating rhetoric, provides
the intellectual understanding and heuristics to resist racism and
otherforms of hegemony.
Discourse communities see power coming from the bottom up,
each community creating its own epistemological and power
structure. For feminism,especially in relation to the bottom up

geneaological theories of Foucault,an understanding of discourse
communities can give awareness to the primarily productive, but

also repressive, aspects of power as played out in language. In other
words,a discourse community represents will to power in action.

Consequently discourse analysis gives feminists,or any groups that
have been marginalized,a way to understand,resist, or change the
power structure exhibited in the discourse,a way to fight back

against will to truth in action. Language has become one of the major
vehicles for social change within the feminist movement. Maybe this
is why Stanley Fish feels that feminism has "energized more thought

and social action than any other'ism'in the past twenty or thirty
years,including Marxism"(Olson 265).
Yet in feminist epistemic rhetoric there also exists the

foundational and anti-foundational tension. As Jana Sawicki points
out in "Foucault and Feminism: Towards a Politics of Difference,"

universalizing women and women's experiences undermines
progressive efforts,since power rests in the differences of women

(32). Sawicki's anti-essentialist argument asserts that universalizing
women is reverting women's thinking back to a foundational
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feminism. Foundationalism, at least in its patriarchal displays, has
brought the repression of women. Foucault writes that the
differences amongst people,the anti-foundational realities of the

world, represent the true bottom up structure. Sawicki writes:
In short, genealogy as resistance involves using history to give
voice to the marginal and submerged voices which lie 'a little
beneath history'- the voices of the mad,the delinquent,the
abnormal,the disempowered. It locates many discontinuous
and regional struggles against power both in the past and
present. These voices are the sources of resistance, the c

reative subjects of history.(28)

Discourse communities and epistemic rhetoric, giving light to antifoundational differences,can both resist the repression that comes

from essentializing, universalizing,and creating foundations for
normalcy and hence repression.

It's no coincidence that contemporary epistemic rhetoric's post-

modem resurgence has been articulated during the civil rights and
feminist movements. The political power that epistemic rhetoric can
assert should make it clearer now why James Berlin perfers an
ideological definition of epistemic rhetoric over a Fulkerson-like

theoretical one. Epistemic rhetoric is a way for composition
practitioners to understand and resist the limiting effects of

language,as wellas understand and use the enabling effects of

language,since epistemic rhetoric is inevitably ideological and
political.

Gregory Clark, a proponent of discourse community theory,
argues that we must deal directly with the exclusionary tensions in

discourse communities if we are to ethically and democratically teach
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reading and writing: "The political assumptions that underlie the
rhetoric of the discourse community as it has been articulated in
composition studies during the last decade seem to support

democracy in principle, yet tend to undermine it in practice"(61). If
Clark is right,epistemic rhetoric,a rhetoric that is knowledge

creating and aware of the legacy of will to truth and will to power
within language,is in danger of encouraging non-participatory
practices that it has struggled so hard to become aware of. Clark

feels that this is true because,"It does so by denying the presence of
unresolved conflict, and denying in the process equal participation in
the discourse to those who disagree"(61). Agreement,therefore,can

not be the only basis of a truly participatory discourse community,

because in disagreement knowledge is found. But this knowledge

making through disagreement can tear a discourse community apart.
Keeping the feeling ofcommunity within this tension,a productive
tension that balances inclusionary/anti-foundational and
exclusionary/foundational forces,takes a different ethical and

epistemological point of view,a point of view that encourages "a
politics of difference"(63). Clark writes:

"The discourse I am describing here renders the progress of
expertise in a community secondary to a relational and
epistemological practice ofconfronting differences so that its
participants can come to understand how the beliefs and
purposes of others can call their own into question ... This is the
only agreement that supports a democratic discourse of
community. A classroom reconstructed along these lines would
situate the development of expertise in writing and reading,or
in anything else, within this agreement to rescue the discourse
of community from domination and exclusion"(73).
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An epistemic classroom that can do this and retain its sense of
history can rise to Clark's call.

In "Discourse on Language" Foucault demonstrates how difficult
entry into a discourse community can be. He describes this sense of

exclusion as the "I" being trapped between "Inclination" and
"Institution" That is, the self doesn't know where to start in the river

of discourse that has been placed before it by the powers that be.
Kurt Spellmeyer makes an ingenious reading of this difficult Foucault

piece in "Foucault and the Freshman Writer: Considering the Self in

Discourse." Discourse is more often than not seen by young writers
as exclusionary. Young writers can feel that exclusionary tension,

but usually can't put it into the language of the discourse they are
being excluded by. For many students this seems like a traditional

rite of passage or possibly a game;they must adapt to the discourse
because the initiate has always adapted not the community. Yet by
giving the students the discourse to understand its exclusionary
power,the students can reverse the"game" and use that same

exclusionary discourse to enter, to make it inclusionary. "Foucault
maintains ... we speak first, and then leam what we have said and

whom we have become"(Spellmeyer 723). This is a friendly way to
use Foucault in the writing class,a way that epistemic rhetoric would
enable. An epistemic classroom would have the students use the

discourse,find the meaning in their writing, and worry later,
possibly in revision and portfolio use, whether that discourse is

appropriate for entry.

87

Does each epistemic composition practitioner need to create

their own curriculum from scratch and tie in all these pedagogical

and epistemological issues into a perfect web? No. Epistemic
rhetoric is continually in the process of social construction,and
pedagogical help is continually being written. There is a lot of
support to be found,and continual possibilities exist for collaboration

with the vibrant and knowledge generating epistemic rhetoric
discourse community. For instance,in the English and composition
journals there is a lot of support to be found. Across the nation there

are English and composition faculties that subscribe to the epistemic
rhetoric theory. And there are many studentcentered composition
textbooks that represent the epistemic stance. To list a few: Ways of
Reading by Bartholmae and Petrosky,Inquiry by Bloom and White,

TheInformed Reader by Bazerman,The St. Martin's Guide To

Writing by Axelrod and Cooper,Forming,Thinking, Writing by
Berthoff,and Style:An Anti-Textbook by Lanham. For those

composition practioners who are not already part of the epistemic
rhetoric discourse community,entrance can easily be made available.

Foucaultsums up the thoughts of most anyone trying to enter a
discourse community,including a composition practitioner trying to
enter the epistemic rhetoric discourse community,as follows:
"In a society such as our own we all know the rules of
exclusion. The most obvious and familiar of these concerns is

whatis prohibited. We know perfectly well that we are not
free to say just anything,that we cannot simply speak ofjust
anything. We have three types of prohibition,covering objects,
ritual with its surrounding circumstances,the privileged or
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exclusive right to speak of a particular subject; these
prohibitions interrelate,reinforce and complement eachother,
forming a complex web,continually subject to modification. I
will note simply that the areas where this web is most tightly
woven today, where the danger spots are most numerous,are
those dealing with politics and sexuality"(The Discourse on
Language 216).

Conclusion

As discussed above,epistemic rhetoric is political, and its

ideology is busy unweaving the web ofrepression through such
examples as anti-racist and feminist discourse. It is doing this in
standard composition classrooms where the teachers are epistemic

rhetoricians,and it is doing this in writing across the curriculum
programs that are institutionalizing the theory ofdiverse and anti-

foundational discourse communities. The legacy ofinfluence, that I

believe epistemic rhetoric will create in contemporary composition
studies,is a legacy of continual self-definition, or continual

knowledge creation. Within an ethos ofinclusion over exclusion,

inclusion enables the student reader and writer instead oflimiting
him or her. Epistemic rhetoric will continue to embody the dialectic
of truth and its relationship to language,a truth that was once seen
dominantly as foundational and exclusionary,and is now seen as

anti-foundational and inclusionary. Its history has been long,and its
continuing legacy will remain influential,I believe, whether it is
called epistemic rhetoric or not.
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